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I. INTRODUCTION
The prevailing negotiation theory tries to fit lots of square
pegs into just two round holes—adversarial or cooperative bargain-
ing.1  In the real world, negotiation comes in many different
shapes, not just circles and squares.  This Article demonstrates that
the two “round holes” in current negotiation theory are poorly de-
fined and do not reflect the reality of much pretrial negotiation.  It
argues that it is time to replace the system of theoretical models
with a flexible framework that can accommodate virtually all legal
negotiations, including those that do not fit into any pre-defined
model.
This Article compares generally-accepted theories of legal ne-
gotiation with empirical accounts of lawyers’ negotiations to illus-
trate some misconceptions in the theories, including the definition
of the two negotiation models.  To provide a snapshot of contem-
porary legal negotiation theory,2 this Article analyzes nine law
school negotiation textbooks.3
1 Although current negotiation theory includes some variations of the two major models,
those two models clearly dominate. See infra Part IV.
2 Professor Thomas Kuhn argues that “textbooks expound the body of accepted theory,”
which is reflected in generally-accepted paradigms similar to “accepted judicial decision[s] in
common law.” See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10, 23 (4th
ed. 2012).  He defines “paradigms” (as used in this context) as “elements” in a “constellation of
beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community” that are
“models or examples [that] can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining
puzzles of normal science.” Id. at 174.  For discussion of legal negotiation, see infra note 4.
3 CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (7th ed. 2012);
JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW (2d
ed. 2011);  DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2007);
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY (3d ed. 2014); CARRIE J. MENKEL-
MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING (2d ed. 2014);  ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DIS-
PUTES (2000); MELISSA L. NELKEN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2007); ALAN
SCOTT RAU, ET AL., NEGOTIATION (3d ed. 2006); GERALD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES B.
CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING (2007).  All of these texts were designed for use in law school
courses except for Beyond Winning, which often is used as a law school text.  They were selected
because they focus exclusively on negotiation, unlike texts that cover other dispute resolution
processes.  The authors are highly-respected academics, many of whom have practice experience.
The purpose of citing these texts is to critique negotiation theory, not the texts or authors.
The texts generally have a similar structure and cover the same general topics.  Most include
an introductory chapter, identify different negotiation models, note special issues related to law-
yer-client relationships, describe basic negotiation techniques, discuss psychological and identity
issues, analyze ethical and legal constraints, and sketch the use of mediation and other dispute
resolution processes.  There are some significant variations between the texts, but most of the
differences are not relevant to this Article.  Relevant differences are noted below.
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This Article focuses on lawyers’ negotiation processes in pre-
trial litigation.4  Good legal negotiation theory should encompass
the full range of lawyers’ negotiation activities.  A major problem
with most legal negotiation theories is the narrow definition of ne-
gotiation that does not recognize that negotiation and litigation are
“inseparably entwined.”5  Some negotiation texts refer to legal ne-
gotiation occurring in the context of litigation, but they generally
include little, if any, material that specifically discusses the relation-
Most of the texts include excerpts and/or citations of theoretical publications selected by the
authors to reflect the most significant relevant theory.  Moreover, most of the texts are updated
editions, indicating that they contain the most current versions of the theoretical arguments.  A
survey of the texts does not provide a perfect portrait of contemporary theory because they do
not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the relevant theory.  Nonetheless, such a
survey does provide a good summary of generally-accepted negotiation theory.  This Article
notes points of greater and lesser agreement between the texts.
4 Negotiation used by lawyers differs in significant respects from negotiation used by other
professionals who regularly negotiate, such as merchants and diplomats.  Negotiation is an inte-
gral part of lawyers’ work as agents of their clients and, in pretrial litigation, it is organized and
regulated as part of a distinctive set of elaborate institutional and social systems.
Parties and lawyers regularly negotiate in appellate litigation and some of the dynamics are
similar, but there are some significant differences that may affect the negotiation dynamics in the
two settings.  In pretrial litigation, parties often spend a great deal of effort to learn and establish
the facts whereas in appellate litigation, the facts have been determined by the courts and the
disputed issues typically are legal issues (though the legal issues may relate to whether the trial
court properly determined the facts).  The population of parties and cases differs in pretrial and
appellate litigation because of the departure from the population of appellate cases of cases that
do not involve litigation after the pretrial or trial process.  Moreover, in appellate litigation, the
perspectives and relationships between the parties and lawyers are likely to be significantly af-
fected by the history of the litigation, financial and other investments used to reach an adjudica-
tion, and the passage of time, among other things.
Many lawyers also regularly negotiate transactional matters, though such negotiations are
not regulated by an extensive body of procedural law and the courts do not adjudicate disputes
in these negotiations (other than disputes about the agreements reached in negotiation).  Some
insights in this Article could be adapted for negotiation in appellate litigation and transactions as
well as negotiations that do not involve lawyers.
For simplicity, this Article focuses on cases where there are only two parties and each party
is represented by a lawyer.  When appropriate given the context, “party” may include the party’s
lawyer and vice versa.  Similarly, “negotiator” and the “other side” may refer to a lawyer or
party or both.  This Article uses the term “counterpart (lawyer)” instead of “opposing counsel”
because lawyers representing parties on opposite sides of a case often cooperate as well as op-
pose each other. See John Lande, Getting Good Results for Clients by Building Good Working
Relationships with “Opposing Counsel,” 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 107, 107 n.1 (2011). See gener-
ally Jonathan R. Cohen, Adversaries? Partners? How About Counterparts? On Metaphors in the
Practice and Teaching of Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 433 (2003)
(discussing significance of terminology in referring to other party in negotiation).  “Legal negoti-
ation” refers to negotiation conducted by lawyers.  Sometimes this Article uses the term “negoti-
ation” instead of “legal negotiation” for simplicity.  For discussion of the definition of
“negotiation,” see infra Part III.
5 Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 269 (1984).
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ship between litigation and negotiation.6  They give the impression
that litigation is a discrete and independent process except for
negotiators’ analysis of possible trial outcomes (such as the best,
worst, or most likely alternatives to a negotiated agreement).7
Many of the texts imply that negotiation begins after the end of a
largely irrelevant pretrial litigation process.  All the texts refer to
the process of obtaining necessary information, though this is usu-
ally presented as part of a discrete negotiation process without ref-
erence to the pretrial discovery process that lawyers typically use.8
Although pretrial litigation is ostensibly designed to prepare
cases for trials (which do not actually occur in most cases),9 the
6 See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 1–2 (negotiation can “streamline” litigation even if parties
do not settle); FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 373–76 (judicial promotion of settlement);
GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 1, 7 (“nothing is more important to your success as a negotiator than
preparation–your understanding of the relevant facts and law and of your client’s interests” but
discovery may not be feasible because of the time and expense and the negotiation process is the
only way to learn the other side’s perspective);  KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 427–55 (rules en-
couraging settlement in litigation including fee shifting, offer of settlement, judicial settlement
conferences, and inadmissibility of settlement negotiations); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra
note 3, at 437–42, 463–64 (participation in judicial settlement conferences and judicial review of
settlement); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 108–18 (litigation dynamics inhibiting settlement);
but see NELKEN, supra note 3, at 2, 10–19, 46, 84–90 (the context of litigation and bargaining in
the shadow of the law); RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–85 (substantial introductory chapter
discussing lawyers, litigation, and dispute resolution processes); WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra
note 3, at 89–92 (interplay between litigation and negotiation as well as effects of pretrial confer-
ences on case settlements).
7 See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 58–61; FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 77–80, 132–38;
GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 52–57; KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 29–30, 42–48; MENKEL-MEADOW
ET AL., supra note 3, at 88–95; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 232–40; NELKEN, supra note 3,
at 33–37; RAU ET AL. , supra note 3, at 87–90, 107–16; WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 79.
The texts generally focus on the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) al-
though, during negotiation, lawyers and parties probably focus at least as much on the worst—
and especially the most likely—alternatives to a negotiated agreement.  For example, for a de-
fendant, the best alternative is to have a case dismissed immediately, paying little in legal fees.
Nonetheless, many defendants routinely pay plaintiffs in settlement because they recognize that
there is a significant risk of loss at trial and a certainty of paying additional legal fees.  Parties
and lawyers probably consider BATNAs when formulating initial positions but probably focus
more on the most likely and worst alternatives as litigations proceed.
8 See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 87–114; FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 90–98; GIF-
FORD, supra note 3, at 98–112; KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 8–10; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 41–77, 233–38; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 28–37, 188–93; NELKEN, supra
note 3, at 41–42, 93, 96–97, 337–41; RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 107–16; but see WILLIAMS &
CRAVER, supra note 3, at 78-79 (“The most important stage of most bargaining interactions
takes place before the parties even begin their serious discussions.  This is where the negotiators
initially ascertain the relevant factual, legal, economic, medical, cultural, and other
information.”).
9 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460–61, 507 (2004) (analyzing data
showing that federal district court trial rates declined from 11.5% to 1.8% between 1962 and
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predominant reality of litigators’ work is captured in Professor
Marc Galanter’s term, “litigotiation,” which he defines as “the stra-
tegic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court pro-
cess.”10  In an observation that is still as true today as it was three
decades ago, he noted:
On the contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of
disputes is not an alternative to litigation.  It is only a slight ex-
aggeration to say that it is litigation.  There are not two distinct
processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single process of
disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals.”11
In practice, negotiation is routinely infused in litigation from
the outset of a case.  Lawyers not only negotiate about the ultimate
issues, such as how much a defendant will pay a plaintiff, but they
also negotiate about substantive issues during litigation, such as
temporary orders during divorce proceedings, as well as a myriad
2002 and that the trial rate in 22 states declined from 36.1% to 15.8% between 1976 and 2002).
Some cases are resolved through procedures other than settlement or trial such as cases termi-
nated by motion or default judgment.  Thus it is not accurate to assert, for example, that if only
2% of cases are tried then 98% are settled.  A study of Hawaii cases found that at least 88% of
tort cases and 54% of contract cases settled in 2007, though these figures do not include dismis-
sals without prejudice or for inaction, which may reflect settlements in some cases. See John
Barkai & Elizabeth Kent, Let’s Stop Spreading Rumors About Settlement and Litigation: A Com-
parative Study of Settlement and Litigation in Hawaii Courts, 29  OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 85,
106–11 (2014). See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70
JUDICATURE 161, 162–64 (1986) (finding that only 63% of cases in a random sample from se-
lected state and federal and state courts terminated in 1978 were settled, 7% were tried, and the
remaining 30% were terminated by default, referral to arbitration, dismissal, or other court
decisions).
10 Galanter, supra note 5, at 268.  Professor Debra Emmelman’s ethnographic study of crimi-
nal practice provides a similar analysis.  She argues that:
[P]lea bargaining [is] part of the defense attorney’s recursive consideration of
whether a case should be settled immediately or proceed further.  “Proceeding fur-
ther” means that, until an attorney achieves an acceptable plea bargain, s/he pro-
ceeds to litigate a case throughout various court hearings that could ultimately lead
to a jury trial and sentencing.  Viewed in this manner, plea bargaining can be seen to
encompass not only multiple episodes of negotiating behavior but also a wide range
of formal litigation proceedings.  As such, distinctions made between plea bargaining
and taking a case to trial can actually be seen as relatively minor.
Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of Recursive Decision-
making, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 336 (1996). See also Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based
Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 73–88 (1985) (describing
negotiation in context of litigation of criminal and personal injury cases).
Building on Galanter’s concept of litigotiation, I described “liti-mediation” cultures, where
“it has become taken for granted that mediation is the normal way of ending litigation.”  John
Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 839, 846 (1997).  Thus, in practice, often there is no clear line between litigation, negotia-
tion, and other dispute resolution processes.
11 Galanter, supra note 5, at 268 (emphasis in original).
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of procedural issues.  The process of reaching such agreements
often is integrated into regular communications throughout the
course of pretrial litigation rather than occurring in a single dra-
matic settlement event to resolve the ultimate issues in a case.  In-
deed, this study identified a number of cases clearly involving
litigotiation.12  To provide a realistic basis for analyzing negotiation
theory, this Article considers negotiation as the process of lawyers
seeking agreement regardless of the stage of litigation, nature of
the issue, or the level of contentiousness.13  In other words, this
Article is about litigotiation, not merely final negotiations of ulti-
mate issues untethered to the rest of the pretrial process.
A major problem in legal negotiation theory is the excessive
focus on the adversarial and cooperative models of negotiation
noted at the outset of this Article.14  In the adversarial model,
negotiators try to maximize their own interests through strategic
exchanges of offers.  In the cooperative model, negotiators identify
both parties’ interests and possible resolutions that would satisfy
the parties’ interests.15  Because negotiation generally is portrayed
as a discrete process for the final resolution of disputes, these mod-
els lend themselves to dramatic portrayals, which I described this
way:
Romantic narratives of negotiation involve a single, dramatic
settlement event to resolve the ultimate issues at stake.  One
version–a legalistic and positional narrative–involves an ex-
tended series of strategic offers and counter-offers, often involv-
ing hard bargaining to maximize negotiators’ respective partisan
advantages.  Protagonists approach negotiation as a kind of
high-stakes poker game in which they may win or lose great
sums depending on how shrewdly they “play their cards.”  The
second version, an interest-based narrative, involves an explicit
and systematic identification of parties’ interests and options
with the goal of identifying solutions that would maximize both
parties’ interests.  The heroes of the interest-based stories use
good communication and clever problem-solving tactics to save
their clients from unnecessary impasse or suboptimal agree-
12 See infra text accompanying notes 66–67, 76–78, 127–34 (cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 13–14).
13 For further discussion of the definition of negotiation, see infra Part III.
14 People use various terms identifying these two basic models. See Leonard L. Riskin, Un-
derstanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13–16 (1996) (collecting sources and noting various terms used distin-
guishing approaches to negotiation).  This Article refers to them as positional and interest-based
negotiation.  For further discussion of negotiation models, see infra Part IV.
15 For the classic versions of these stories, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 3–95 (2d ed. 1991).
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ments, thus creating value, efficiency, and satisfaction for both
parties.16
Although people generally recognize that many negotiations are
less dramatic than these romantic stories, negotiation theory is lim-
ited to these two basic models (or some combination/variation of
them).17
This Article proposes a broad framework for developing more
complete theories of legal negotiation but, for two reasons, it does
not try to provide a definitive portrait of how lawyers negotiate.
First, it is not practically possible to produce such a portrait be-
cause the phenomena are too complex, with too many variables
affecting the dynamics of the cases.  These include variations in lo-
cal legal culture, subject matter, amount at stake, power relation-
ships, and psychological and interpersonal dynamics, among many
others.  Moreover, the litigotiation process often occurs over an ex-
tended period of time and the final negotiations are strongly
colored by the earlier interactions.  To develop something ap-
proaching an accurate portrait, scholars would need a much more
extensive body of empirical research focusing on lawyers’ actual
behavior than has been conducted or is likely to be conducted in
the foreseeable future.18
Second, this framework is based on a study involving a small
sample of lawyers in one state who were not randomly selected.19
16 John Lande, Teaching Students to Negotiate like a Lawyer, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109,
113 (2012) (footnote omitted).  Professor Russell Korobkin provides an intentionally caricatured
version of the stories from the perspective of proponents of the cooperative approach.  In this
telling, proponents of cooperative (or “integrative”) negotiation tout their superiority over the
adversarial (or “distributive”) negotiation:
[Integrative negotiators] display subtlety, creativity, intelligence, and sophistication.
In contrast, negotiators who employ distributive tactics are surly Neanderthals who
try to use brute force and other boorish, knuckle-dragging behavior to subjugate
their opponents.  Teaching negotiation is viewed by many as the task of civilizing the
great unwashed horde of naive, instinctive negotiators and convincing them to re-
nounce their backward, distributive ways.
Russell Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2008).
Some proponents of distributive negotiation undoubtedly have a similarly unflattering perspec-
tive of integrative negotiation as a naive notion reflecting a lack of understanding about the way
the world really works.
17 For discussion of negotiation models in negotiation theory and as used by lawyers in this
study, see infra Part IV.
18 In 1991, Professor Herbert Kritzer wrote, “With the exception of the divorce area, most
discussions’ analyses of negotiation and settlement of civil cases have been theoretical and pre-
scriptive, with few attempts to assess the theories against large numbers of actual cases.” HER-
BERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN
ORDINARY LITIGATION 131 (1991). This is still true today.
19 For description of the data in this study, see infra Part II.
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The subjects provided their own perspectives about cases that they
negotiated but they could not provide accurate perspectives of
other negotiators in those cases.  Although they provided fairly de-
tailed accounts of the cases, many details were omitted due to time
limitations.
Thus, this Article does not attempt to represent the way that a
specific population of lawyers actually negotiates or the frequency
of particular negotiation phenomena.  Instead, it uses lawyers’ ac-
counts of negotiations to identify problems in current theoretical
conceptions, sketch elements of a more helpful framework, and
suggest future theoretical, research, practice, and teaching initia-
tives.  Despite the limitations of the research methodology, this
analysis of lawyers’ actual negotiation behavior can help theorists
transcend some limitations of purely theoretical or prescriptive
analyses and empirical research based on hypothetical scenarios.20
Part II of this Article describes the empirical data in this study.
Part III discusses common understandings of negotiation, noting
that some people do not consider an interaction to be negotiation
unless it is an attempt to resolve an actual dispute.  Because law-
yers routinely reach agreements in pretrial litigation about undis-
puted issues, this Article argues that it is more helpful to focus on
the process of seeking agreement than focusing merely on the pro-
cess of resolving disputes.  Since that phrase is cumbersome, this
Article uses the word “negotiation” as having this broader
meaning.
Part IV relies on the interview subjects’ detailed accounts of
cases to analyze the two traditional negotiation models as well as a
third model that I have called “ordinary legal negotiation” (OLN).
In OLN, lawyers try to reach a reasonable agreement based on
shared norms, which usually are the expected outcomes in court or
typical agreements in similar cases.  Parts IV.A and IV.B review
textbook definitions of the two traditional models and finds that
20 Much empirical research on negotiation involves laboratory settings or responses to hypo-
thetical cases using students or other non-lawyer subjects.  While such research can produce
valuable insights, there are considerable limitations on the applicability of the findings to the
real-life behavior of lawyers in actual litigotiations. See Robert J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining
Theory’s New “Prospecting” Agenda: It May Be Social Science, But Is it News?, 10 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 215, 232–43, 269–71 (2010) (critiquing “research on legal bargaining . . . based on
questionnaires asking lawyers how they bargain, or hypothetical decision scenarios asking col-
lege students (and others) to resolve bargaining judgment problems”) (footnote omitted); Rich-
ard K. Neumann, Jr. & Stefan H. Krieger, Empirical Inquiry Twenty-Five Years after the
Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 375–76 (2003) (arguing that experimental studies
about negotiation that use student subjects and/or ask subjects to perform simplified tasks seem
“sterile and unpersuasive”).
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there is a lack of consensus about these models and that many of
the elements ascribed to them do not necessarily occur in real-life
cases.  Part IV.C documents lawyers’ use of OLN, both as an ap-
proach to resolving ultimate issues in a case and as an omnipresent
process in which lawyers generally manage their cases in
litigotiation.
Part V presents a framework for analyzing negotiations that
addresses the problems identified in Part IV.  Part V.A sets out the
framework and Part V.B uses cases in this study to illustrate the
framework.  The framework builds on current theory to make it
more useful.  It does not provide a new model of negotiation but
rather, is a tool for analysis of negotiation that can be continuously
refined.  Instead of focusing only on bundles of characteristics for
each model that are assumed to be highly correlated with each
other, the framework unbundles the variables, permitting scholars,
practitioners, and students to describe negotiations more accu-
rately.  The unbundled variables in the framework are: (1) the de-
gree of concern, if any, negotiators have for the other side, (2) the
communication process used in trying to reach agreement, (3) the
extent that negotiators create value in the negotiation, (4) the
negotiators’ tone, (5) the use of power in negotiation, and (6) the
source of norms that negotiators use.
Part VI.A summarizes the problems and omissions of current
theory identified in this study and suggests approaches for future
scholarship and empirical research.  It argues that the system of the
theoretical models is too confusing and should be replaced with a
flexible framework that is readily understandable and that better
fits actual pretrial negotiation.  Part VI.B describes how lawyers
can use the framework to improve their work.  Part VI.C encour-
ages faculty teaching courses dealing with pretrial litigation and ne-
gotiation to incorporate insights about litigotiation and to use
multi-stage simulations.  It shows how faculty can use the frame-
work to help students avoid the confusion caused by the current
theory and better understand negotiation dynamics.  Part VII is the
conclusion.
II. EMPIRICAL DATA
This study is based on thirty-two semi-structured interviews of
lawyers conducted between March and May 2013.  The subjects are
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based in Kansas City, Saint Louis, and Boone County, Missouri.21
Chairs of county bar association committees were invited to be in-
terviewed and/or to nominate other lawyers to be interviewed.22  I
used a snowball sampling process, which consists of asking subjects
to suggest other lawyers who they considered to be good lawyers23
and I interviewed some of the suggested lawyers.  Toward the end
of the data collection period, I interviewed three Collaborative
lawyers specifically to describe interest-based negotiations.24  I is-
sued twenty-six invitations that did not result in interviews, which
was usually due to non-response to invitation emails, though in
some cases it was because the lawyers did not litigate.
The lawyers in the sample had been in practice for three to
forty-six years, with a median of 20.5 years.25  They were in firms or
offices with 1 to 630 lawyers, with a median of 7.5 lawyers.  There
were twenty-three men and nine women in the sample.  Eleven
lawyers were in Boone County, nine in Kansas City, and twelve in
Saint Louis.  The lawyers were promised confidentiality and are
identified with codes based on their location.26
The interviews were conducted by telephone and generally
lasted sixty to ninety minutes.27  After asking general background
questions, I explained that the interview would focus on negotia-
tion of two-sided cases in which both sides were represented by
21 Boone County is located in the center of Missouri.  Columbia is the county seat and had a
population of 113,225 of the 168,535 people in the county in 2012.  U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/29/2915670.html.  It is a university town in the middle of a rural
area.
22 Because the interviews focused on negotiations involving only two parties, I excluded bar
association committees dealing with subjects where there were typically more than two parties
involved in litigation such as bankruptcy, construction, and environmental law.
23 I sought to interview good lawyers to increase the probability of getting descriptions of
cases that were handled well by thoughtful lawyers.
24 In Collaborative Law, the parties and lawyers use a “participation agreement” providing
that they will use interest-based negotiation.  The agreement includes a “disqualification” clause
providing that both Collaborative lawyers would be disqualified from representing their clients if
the case is litigated. See John Lande, An Empirical Analysis of Collaborative Practice, 49 FAM.
CT. REV. 257, 257 (2011).
25 The number of years in practice was calculated based on the number of years since gradu-
ation from law school.
26 E.g., Interview BC 01, KC 02.
27 The research involved an ambitious interview protocol and I did not ask all the questions
of each subject because of time constraints.  After conducting about half of the interviews, I
deleted some questions that did not seem to produce worthwhile data and I added some ques-
tions to elaborate on issues discussed in the original protocol.  I did not take complete verbatim
notes of the interviews and most of the data reported in this Article summarizes or paraphrases
the subjects’ statements.  Some language is shown in quotation marks, which I am fairly confi-
dent accurately reflects the subjects’ words.
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counsel and there was not a mediation.28  Much of the time in the
interviews was devoted to discussing the most recent such case that
they settled.29  Subjects told the stories of the cases from their first
contact with the case until settlement.  In addition to developing an
overall narrative of the cases, I asked the subjects: (1) when the
negotiation began; (2) who initiated the negotiation; (3) why the
negotiation was initiated at that time; (4) the time period between
the first communication until final agreement; (5) whether the sub-
ject previously knew the lawyer for the other party; (6) how well
the lawyers got along; (7) if the lawyers’ relationship affected the
negotiation process or outcome; (8) if the parties directly partici-
pated in the negotiation; (9) what the lawyers communicated about
the negotiation with the client; (10) how the subjects prepared for
the negotiation; (11) how much of the negotiation was conducted
by phone, email, letter, or in person; (12) if both sides identified
their interests or goals early in the negotiation; (13) what the sub-
jects thought were the main goals of each side; (14) if there was any
negotiation about the litigation process itself  (such as discovery,
timing, information sharing, or motions); (15) if there was a series
of offers and counter-offers, and if so, how many times the parties
exchanged offers; (16) what was the first offer or demand from
each side; (17) what was the final agreement; (18) why the parties
accepted the agreement that they did (as opposed to some other
possible agreement); (19) the extent, if any, that the resolution was
based on expectations about the likely result in court or typical
settlements in similar cases; (20) whether the subjects thought that
the settlement was appropriate; (21) how satisfied they felt about
the negotiation process; and (22) how typical this negotiation was
compared to their other recent two-sided negotiations of this type
of case.  Of course, the subjects provided only their perspectives
(including some perceptions of others’ perspectives in the negotia-
tion).  The cases are intended to illustrate common dynamics rather
28 I explained the parameters of the study to the subjects as follows:
All my questions will focus on negotiation of disputes though these may be disputes
that are settled without a lawsuit.  This interview will NOT ask about negotiations of
transactions.  All the questions will be about cases where there were only two sides,
both sides were represented by lawyers, and there was not a mediation.  Note that
there may be more than one party on the same side, such as a couple in a suit against
another party.
Mediated cases were generally excluded because the negotiation dynamic is very different
in a specific settlement event.
29 Asking subjects to describe the most recent settled case reduces the risk of selection bias,
though that is not a major concern in this study because the data is not used to generate popula-
tion estimates.
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than to determine the precise reality of particular cases or to estab-
lish frequency estimates.
Half of the cases were either divorce (ten cases) or criminal
cases (six cases).  There were a range of other cases including com-
mercial, employment discrimination, family trust, foreclosure, la-
bor, landlord-tenant, intellectual property, personal injury, product
liability, real estate, and workers compensation.30
III. DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION
Legal negotiation texts vary in their definitions of negotiation.
Some definitions are quite broad and others include a variety of
conditions that unnecessarily narrow the scope of interactions fit-
ting in the definition.  One text makes the following broad state-
ment, “Anytime you deal with someone else, seeking to reach
agreement on some matter, you are involved in a negotiation,”31
which provides a helpful way to analyze lawyers’ behavior.  Using
the phrase “process of seeking agreement” instead of “negotia-
tion” would avoid some of the confusion based on theoretical and
commonplace notions of negotiation, as described below.  Unfortu-
nately, this phrase is cumbersome.  So, for simplicity, this Article
uses the two terms interchangeably.
If one includes routine interactions leading to agreement, ne-
gotiation is a process that includes “getting to okay” conversations
as well as more dramatic “getting to YES” settlement events.32
This broad notion of negotiation provides a better account of law-
yers’ actual behavior in pretrial litigation than the narrower, condi-
tional conceptions of negotiation in some texts, as described below.
30 The distribution of subject areas of the cases was partially by design but mostly was not.  I
was interested in divorce cases because they lend themselves to a wide variety of approaches to
negotiation.  I specifically included several Collaborative Law cases (which were necessarily di-
vorce cases) because I wanted to document some cases where the lawyers self-consciously used
an interest-based negotiation approach.  I included several criminal cases to document cases
using an ordinary legal negotiation approach, which often is used in criminal cases.  On the other
hand, some of the lawyers I interviewed handle a variety of types of cases, so the cases they
discussed reflected the last cases they happened to settle.  All but one of the criminal cases were
from Boone County.  Otherwise, there was a broader distribution of case types from the differ-
ent locations.
31 NELKEN, supra note 3, at 1.  It is not clear whether this statement was intended as a defini-
tion but it can serve that function.
32 See FISHER & URY, supra note 15 (emphasis in original); supra note 16 and accompanying
text (describing stories of dramatic settlement events in both interest-based and positional
negotiation).
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Despite the fact that pretrial litigation is supposed to prepare
for trial, such preparation often is designed to prepare for negotia-
tion because the expected trial outcome is a major factor affecting
negotiation in many, if not most, cases.  Indeed, some lawyers con-
tinuously consider how the litigation process may affect negotia-
tion.  For example, one lawyer said, “It is all negotiation from the
time suit is filed.  You are constantly negotiating or setting up the
negotiation.  It doesn’t just happen.  You are negotiating from the
outset, setting up where you want to go.  You are judging [the
other side] and they are judging you.”33  He elaborated, “Negotia-
tions don’t occur in a week or a month.  They occur in the entire
time of the lawsuit.  If anyone tells you they aren’t negotiating,
they really are.  Every step in the process is a negotiation.  You
don’t call it negotiation, but in effect, that’s what it is.”34  Another
lawyer expressed the same view, saying that he “prepares for set-
tlement from day one of the lawsuit” and that there is a “constant
process of evaluating the claim” throughout the litigation.35  A
third lawyer said that he “always has an eye toward settling,” tak-
ing care of matters as fast and cheaply as possible and minimizing
clients’ risk.36  This study documents numerous cases illustrating
this litigotiation approach.37
During pretrial litigation, lawyers regularly reach numerous
agreements with many different people on the path toward resolv-
ing their cases.  Most obviously, lawyers negotiate with each other
about matters such as “acceptance of service of process, extension
of filing deadlines, scheduling of depositions, resolution of discov-
ery disputes, and numerous other procedural matters.”38  Lawyers
agree with clients about the tasks that they each will perform and
33 Interview, KC 06.
34 Id.
35 Interview, BC 05.
36 Interview, KC 02.
37 For definition of litigotiation, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.  For description of
cases in this study illustrating litigotiation, see infra text accompanying notes 66–67, 76–78,
127–34 (cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 13–14). See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 3–4 (arguing that negotiation
begins with the first contact between negotiators); HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING:  OUT OF
COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS 19 (1987) (study of negotiation in England
where “[e]very letter written and telephone call made constitutes an integral part of the ‘litigo-
tiation’ process in which positions are taken, adjusted, and redrawn”); cf. JONATHAN M. HYMAN
ET AL., CIVIL SETTLEMENT: STYLES OF NEGOTIATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 164 (1995) (study
of legal negotiation in civil cases finding that lawyers differed about whether their negotiation
and overall litigation strategies were integrated or whether they treated negotiation as a separate
activity at the end of the litigation process).
38 Lande, supra note 16, at 123. See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting that lawyers
negotiate about procedural matters in pretrial litigation).
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how the lawyer will respond to the other side at various points dur-
ing the litigation.  Lawyers reach agreements with people such as
co-workers in their firms, process servers, investigators, court re-
porters, technical experts, financial professionals, and mediators.39
Lawyers regularly reach agreements with judges about case man-
agement issues such as discovery plans and schedules, referral to
ADR procedures, and ultimate issues during judicial settlement
conferences.40
Although the process of resolving difficult disputes with coun-
terparts about the ultimate issues merits serious attention, focusing
exclusively on those interactions overlooks the vast number of law-
yers’ interactions in which they try to reach agreement.  Indeed,
the instances of lawyers seeking agreement without difficult dis-
putes are so plentiful and obvious that it is as if they are hiding in
plain sight.41
Various definitions of negotiation include elements that are
not necessary or helpful including, but not limited to, the existence
of a dispute.  For example, some texts include only interactions in
which the other person has some control over the subject matter.42
Although this element makes sense descriptively, it does not signif-
icantly restrict the class of phenomena involved because it is hard
to imagine many negotiations where a party has no control over
the subject.
39 See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that lawyers negotiate with clients and law firm
personnel as well as counterpart lawyers).
40 For further discussion of how lawyers seek agreement during pretrial litigation, see Lande,
supra note 16, at 121–23.  In Kritzer’s study of negotiation in ordinary litigation, 80% of lawyers
reported spending no more than 20% of their time in the cases on settlement discussions, but
“many other activities (e.g., conferring with the client, discovery, other factual investigation),
which together typically take almost half the lawyers’ time . . . are often closely related to settle-
ment discussions.” KRITZER, supra note 18, at 32.  Moreover, that analysis focused only on the
resolution of the ultimate issues in a case but not on various procedural negotiations.
Although much pretrial work is oriented toward seeking agreements, some activities do not
fit in this concept, such as arguing summary judgment motions or doing final trial preparation in
cases that will be tried.  One could explore the boundaries of what should be considered the
process of seeking an agreement, but establishing the precise boundaries of this concept is not
necessary for the current analysis.  For the purpose of this Article, suffice it to say that in pretrial
litigation, lawyers spend a significant proportion of their time seeking numerous agreements
with many different people.
41 For further discussion, see infra Part III.
42 See FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 1 (“the process of communication used to get
something we want when another person has control over whether or how we can get it.”);
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 (“People negotiate whenever they need someone
else to help them accomplish their goals.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\16-1\CAC111.txt unknown Seq: 15 22-OCT-14 14:04
2014]FRAMEWORK FOR ADVANCING NEGOTIATION 15
Some definitions indicate that negotiation occurs in the con-
text of actual or potential conflict.43  Since people could have a po-
tential conflict about any issue, having only a potential conflict also
does not seem to exclude interactions that might be considered ne-
gotiations.  For example, one lawyer said that she and her counter-
part were fighting over “everything” in a case.44  While this
obviously was a figure of speech and presumably the lawyers did
not actually fight over every possible aspect of the case, they could
have fought—and negotiated—over virtually anything.  Indeed,
the first issue that lawyers need to consider is whether they will
agree to communicate with each other at all.  Although one might
take this for granted, practitioners do not always do so.  For exam-
ple, one lawyer said that when he gets a letter from his counterpart,
his “natural course” is to respond and negotiate, but he makes a
conscious decision whether to do so or to ignore the letter.45  Thus,
even a decision not to negotiate can be the source of conflict and
the subject of negotiation.  For example, one lawyer lamented that
sometimes she has to press her counterparts to negotiate and make
a counter-offer.46
As suggested by some of the texts, many people think of nego-
tiation as being limited to matters about which the parties actually
are in conflict, though this conception ignores many important ne-
gotiations.  Lawyers regularly suggest options that the other side
accepts without attempted modification.  In criminal cases, a sub-
stantial number of defendants accept the prosecutors’ plea offer
43 See GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 3 (“a process in which two or more participants attempt to
reach a joint decision on matters of common concern in situations where they are in actual or
potential disagreement or conflict”); KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 1 (“an interactive communica-
tion process by which two or more parties who lack identical interests attempt to coordinate
their behavior or allocate scarce resources in a way that will make them both better off than they
could be if they were to act alone.”); RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 86 n.1 (citing several defini-
tions including a “process of potentially opportunistic interaction in which two or more parties,
with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could do
otherwise” and a process where “parties can mutually benefit from reaching agreement on an
outcome from a set of possible outcomes . . . but have conflicting interests over the set of out-
comes”) (citations omitted).
44 Interview, SL 03.
45 Interview, KC 03.
46 Interview, BC 09.  In a study of lawyers who work on a contingency fee, Professor Herbert
Kritzer found that the rate of defendants’ offers responding to initial demands varied widely by
type of case, from a low of 33% in product liability and non-personal injury tort cases to 97% in
automobile accident cases. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CON-
TINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 155 (2004).
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without making a counteroffer.47  Similarly, lawyers regularly make
procedural agreements when one lawyer agrees to a request uncon-
ditionally or after suggesting an alternative that is accepted without
difficulty.48
Conventional conceptions of negotiation often involve various
elements that do not necessarily occur in the process of reaching
agreement.  For example, some people think of negotiation as in-
volving (1) an exchange of offers occurring close in time to each
other, (2) multiple options for handling an issue, (3) an explicit
quid pro quo, and/or (4) something different from normal conver-
sation or professional courtesy.  Although sometimes it may be
helpful to focus on processes that involve explicit disagreements or
such other factors, ignoring interactions without such factors leads
people to overlook much of lawyers’ everyday work of producing
agreements.
IV. MODELS OF NEGOTIATION
Current negotiation theory is based on two general models of
negotiation, though people use many different terms to describe
them.49  The negotiation texts refer to one model as “distribu-
47 For example, a prosecutor who handles felony drug cases said that almost half defendants
accept her initial plea offer without making a counter-offer.  Interview, BC 08.  This is similar to
a study finding that 60% of 5600 defendants in nine counties entering guilty pleas accepted the
prosecutors’ initial plea offer. See JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COM-
MUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS 245 (1999) (describing “consensus” process of agreeing on guilty
pleas).
48 Most of the lawyers in this study said that they did not negotiate about procedural matters
in the cases they described in the interviews.  While some of these cases may not have involved
any procedural agreements, many cases almost certainly did involve such agreements but the
lawyers presumably did not think of the process of reaching the agreements as “negotiation.”
49 Indeed, the “models” may be referred to as approaches or styles, CRAVER, supra note 3, at
11–12; FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 31–49, or as strategies, GIFFORD, supra note 3, at
26–27; RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 116–66; WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 59–65.  I
should note that I refer to the two approaches in my book as well. See JOHN LANDE, LAWYER-
ING WITH PLANNED EARLY NEGOTIATION: HOW YOU CAN GET GOOD RESULTS FOR CLIENTS
AND MAKE MONEY 58–71 (2011).
Professor Donald Gifford distinguishes between negotiation strategies and styles, stating
that strategies refer to specific negotiating behaviors whereas styles refer to personal characteris-
tics reflected in such things as non-verbal communication and tone of voice. GIFFORD, supra
note 3, at 18.  Some texts do not refer to distinct models and, instead, identify “tensions” or
“activities” presumably in every negotiation.  Professor Robert Mnookin and his colleagues refer
to a general tension between creating and distributing value and include a list of “hard-bargain-
ing tactics” for distributing value associated with the traditional model. See MNOOKIN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 17–25. Similarly, Professor Russell Korobkin refers to a “bargaining zone /
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tive,”50 “competitive” and/or “adversarial,”51 or “positional negoti-
ation”52 (or “softer” variations of this model).53  I refer to this
model as “positional negotiation” (PN) because the only common
element in the cases in this study was that parties took substantially
adverse positions.54  The texts refer to the other model as “integra-
tive,”55 “problem-solving,”56 or “cooperative problem-solving.”57  I
use the term “interest-based negotiation” (IBN) reflecting a key
element of explicitly identifying parties’ interests.58  I have theo-
rized a third model of negotiation, which I called “ordinary legal
negotiation” (OLN), based on prior empirical research.59
This part discusses these three models and the extent to which
the cases in this study fit into them.  In real life, some cases do not
perfectly exhibit all the characteristics of a given model.  For exam-
ple, negotiators may use different models to address different is-
sues or they may use one model at one point and use another
model at a later time in the process.  Even so, this study shows that
it is hard both to identify essential features of the different models
and to categorize some cases, which demonstrates the major limita-
tions of traditional negotiation theory.
surplus allocation” framework in which negotiators identify a zone of possible agreement and
then decide on a deal point within that zone. See KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 17–20.
50 MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 161–79; NELKEN, supra note 3, at 33–90.
51 CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12 (“competitive/adversarial”); FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra
note 3, at 31-42 (“competitive/adversarial”); GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 14, 16 (“competitive”);
WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 60–64 (“competitive/adversarial”).
52 RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 116–33.
53 Several texts identify variations that can be considered as “soft positional” negotiation.
See FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 8–9 (identifying “soft positional” negotiation as a more
“friendly” approach that “emphasizes the importance of building and maintaining relation-
ships”).  Along these lines, Professor Donald Gifford identifies a “cooperative” strategy, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow and her co-authors identify an “accommodating” strategy, and Professor Alan
Rau and his colleagues use the term “soft positional” negotiation. See GIFFORD, supra note 3, at
16–19 (negotiators using a cooperative strategy seek an “accommodative” relationship with the
other negotiator but use distributive bargaining tactics, starting with moderate, rather than ex-
treme, bids); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 179–83 (negotiators highly value the
relationship with the counterpart and use a distributional approach); RAU ET AL., supra note 3,
at 125–26 (soft positional bargaining is a softer version of positional negotiation except that
negotiators are “more conciliatory” than in a more traditional positional strategy).
54 See infra Part IV.A.
55 KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 101–35; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 117–60;
NELKEN, supra note 3, at 91–158.
56 GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 14–15; RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 133–47.
57 CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12; FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 42–49; MNOOKIN
ET AL., supra note 3, at 173–271; WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 59–60.
58 See infra Part IV.B.
59 See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Positional Negotiation
Various negotiation texts describe different characteristics of
positional negotiation including goals, assumptions, relationships,
process structure, and tactics.60  Most texts identify the goal of
maximizing negotiators’ results, such as the statement that the pur-
pose of negotiators using a competitive approach is to “obtain the
best possible economic result for your client, usually at the expense
of the other side.”61  Several texts refer to negotiators as having a
zero-sum assumption, such as in the following statement:  “A com-
petitive bargainer is likely to think that negotiation involves a lim-
ited resource or fund that must be distributed between competing
parties–in effect, a fixed economic ‘pie.’”62  Some texts indicate
that competitive negotiators treat the other side as “opponents.”63
One text focuses on the structure of the process, defining positional
negotiation as a process in which “each side takes a position, ar-
gues for it, and makes concessions to reach a compromise.”64  Sev-
60 As the following material illustrates, some texts refer to these characteristics as common
features of this negotiation model rather than as essential elements.
61 FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 32. See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11 (negotia-
tors with a competitive/adversarial style try to maximize their own results); GIFFORD, supra note
3, at 16 (a competitive strategy is designed to “induce the other negotiator to enter into an
agreement with terms less advantageous to his client than those he would have accepted prior to
the negotiation”); KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 14 (an adversarial model focuses on “maximizing
victory”); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 161 (in distributive bargaining, negotiators
are primarily concerned with “winning” by maximizing their gains in dividing limited resources);
NELKEN, supra note 3, at 33 (distributive bargainers try to maximize their own gains).
62 FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 32 (stating an assumption of competitive negotia-
tors that the parties’ relationships or other intangible factors are not of primary importance).
See also KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 14 (an adversarial model is based on the assumption that
the parties want to get as much as possible in a “zero-sum” negotiation); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra
note 3, at 18 (distributive bargainers assume that there is a fixed amount of value to distribute);
NELKEN, supra note 3, at 33 (distributive negotiators assume that if one side receives more, the
other side receives less).
In a zero-sum negotiation, the amount of one party’s gain in an agreement is equal to the
other party’s loss.  In a positive-sum agreement, one party may achieve a gain that would “cost”
the other side less than the value of the first party’s gain, thus “creating value” when considering
the total value for both parties.  Thus the essence of creating value is trading things that one
party values more than the other party. See Korobkin, supra note 16, at 1331.
63 GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 16. See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 12 (negotiators with a
competitive/adversarial style seek to maximize their clients’ interests but not the opponents’
interests); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 161 (competitive negotiators are “less
likely to be interested in the other side’s point of view”); NELKEN, supra note 3, at 33 (distribu-
tive negotiators deal with each other at arm’s length).
64 RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 117 (quoting FISHER & URY, supra note 16, at 3).  In a study
of negotiation of civil cases in New Jersey, lawyers reported exaggerating initial demands and
understating initial offers as part of the PN “settlement ritual” involving a series of concessions
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eral texts also refer to various tactics that negotiators use.  For
example, one text states that in distributive bargaining, negotiators
are “more likely to engage in deceptive, manipulative, or ‘power’
tactics”65 and another text states that distributive negotiation may
involve various “hard-bargaining” tactics such as extreme de-
mands, small and slow concessions, personal insults, threats, puf-
fing, and belittling the counterparts’ alternatives.66
The seventeen cases in this study that have significant posi-
tional characteristics illustrate some but not all of these features.
The only feature appearing in all of the cases was taking substan-
tially adverse positions and, in virtually all cases, the parties ex-
changed offers.  In many, but not all, of the cases, each side
apparently assumed that there were only zero-sum options and
sought to maximize its partisan advantage.  In only a handful of
these cases, the lawyers seemed to have adversarial attitudes to-
ward the other side that went beyond the normal interactions of
counterpart lawyers.  In some PN cases, the parties had intense an-
tagonisms toward each other but most of the accounts did not sug-
gest that the parties had unusually difficult relationships for parties
in legal disputes.  Lawyers reportedly used power tactics in only
two of the cases and, indeed, the lawyers generally described work-
ing together quite professionally in most of the PN cases.  While
the texts’ descriptions of the negotiators’ goals, assumptions, rela-
tionships, and tactics occurred to varying degrees in the PN cases in
this study, there were significant exceptions to all these variables,
except that the parties took substantially adverse positions in all of
these cases.
by both sides.  Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation
Settlement Methods in New Jersey: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 253, 262–65 (1997).
65 MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 161.
66 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 24–25 (distributive tactics involve managing “informa-
tion asymmetries” to persuade counterparts that they cannot receive as much as they would
like). See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12 (negotiators with competitive/adversarial styles
are adversarial and disingenuous, attempt to manipulate opponents, minimize disclosure of in-
formation, start with unrealistic positions, make minimal concessions, and frequently use
threats); GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 16 (competitive bargainers manipulate the perception of the
strength of the respective positions, and use tactics including extreme initial positions, hiding of
information, threats, and slow concessions); RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 117–25 (describing
various “hard” positional tactics such as taking extreme initial positions, providing limited infor-
mation, making small and slow concessions, threatening opponents, and using commitment tac-
tics); WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 61 (describing a “competitive/adversarial” strategy
as involving “tough” negotiation where people move psychologically against opponents, as re-
flected by high aspirations, extreme demands, and few and small concessions).
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The negotiation in Case 1, involving alleged copyright in-
fringement, manifested all the foregoing elements of PN theory.
The owner of a marketing company that distributed materials
through a franchise network sued the franchisor for illegally copy-
ing and distributing the materials.  At first, the parties communi-
cated directly to try to resolve the issues and then their lawyers
negotiated, to no avail.  The defendant ignored the “cease and de-
sist letters” from the plaintiff’s lawyer.  The plaintiff then filed suit
and the defendant filed numerous motions to dismiss the suit,
which were denied.  The plaintiff’s lawyer initiated extensive dis-
covery requests and the defendant made “half-hearted attempts”
to respond.  The plaintiff’s lawyer filed motions to compel re-
sponses and, after waiting about eighteen months for the court to
rule on motions to compel responses, he initiated depositions be-
cause the discovery deadlines were approaching.  The plaintiff’s
lawyer deposed the defendant and the lawyer said that the defense
counsel apparently coached his client during breaks to change his
testimony.  The defense counsel later deposed the plaintiff, intimi-
dating him by making threats and saying “horrible things” about
him.  The plaintiff’s lawyer thought that the defense counsel also
tried to intimidate a witness.  He said that the defense counsel was
the “most unethical attorney [he] had ever encountered.”67
As a result of these experiences, the plaintiff’s lawyer told his
client that he would not be able to withstand the questioning if
they went to trial.  He advised his client to settle, telling him that
he would spend a lot of money but would not get a better result if
he went to trial.  The defendant’s intimidation worked.  The pro-
cess was so unpleasant that the plaintiff said, “Just get me out.  I’ll
take zero.”  Plaintiff’s counsel wanted to get more than that for his
client, however.  They were asking for statutory damages of
$30,000 for each violation.  He had evidence that the defendant
had illegally distributed at least ten copies (each of which would
constitute a violation) and he thought that many more copies were
distributed.  The parties settled for $75,000 and an order requiring
the defendant to return or destroy the materials at issue.  The
plaintiff’s lawyer thought that the resolution was based only on
what the parties were willing to pay or accept and not on the legal
merits of the case.  The defense counsel implicitly acknowledged
that he had behaved improperly by trying to get the plaintiff’s law-
yer to agree not to file an ethical grievance against him.68
67 Interview, KC 05.
68 Id.
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Case 2 also illustrates all the elements of PN described in the
negotiation texts.  In a divorce case, the wife was in her early fifties
and the husband was significantly older.  The husband had used
numerous prostitutes, which had an “extraordinary emotional im-
pact” on the wife.  The key issues were the property division,
whether the wife would receive maintenance, and if so, how much.
At the beginning of the case, the wife authorized her lawyer to
make a settlement offer.  The wife was in counseling and wanted to
“close the wound.”  She asked for a fifty-fifty property division and
substantial maintenance for a limited time.  The husband gave no
response to this offer or to a revised offer.  The wife’s lawyer had
previously dealt with her counterpart and found him to be “diffi-
cult” to work with.  After getting no responses to her settlement
offers, she told him that it was “difficult to negotiate with a lamp.”
This may have prompted him to send an offer, though she consid-
ered it “ridiculous.”69
The parties engaged in extensive discovery, which the wife’s
lawyer described as, “like a PI case for a while.”  She tried to get
information from the husband’s “rehab center” and he resisted, ar-
guing that it was privileged.  Conversely, the husband wanted med-
ical information about his wife’s psychological condition.  There
were many delays due to discovery battles and negotiations about
discovery.  Somehow, the wife obtained damning evidence of a de-
tailed handwritten confession that the husband wrote when he was
in rehab.70
The lawyers took depositions of both parties on the same day.
The wife’s deposition was first and the husband’s lawyer implied
that the wife was responsible for her husband’s misconduct, which
greatly upset her.  The attorneys stepped out of the room and the
wife’s lawyer complained that this questioning was obnoxious.
During the wife’s deposition, her lawyer noticed that the husband
was also getting upset.  The wife’s lawyer said that the trial would
be horrible for both parties.  After the wife’s deposition, the hus-
band said that he was willing to talk about a marital offset in the
property division but not about maintenance.  The wife’s lawyer
thought that the husband’s lawyer was advising him not to settle
the case so that the lawyer could continue earning fees, drawing
from the couple’s sizeable estate.71
69 Interview, BC 06.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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In the husband’s deposition, the wife’s lawyer asked some very
unpleasant questions to quantify the economic harm he caused.
The deposition produced disclosures of many things that wife had
not known and the husband was in tears as he testified.  The wife’s
lawyer said that the process was difficult for both parties and that
the wife would prefer to settle, but the husband’s lawyer appar-
ently scuttled the overture on the day of the depositions.  As the
trial date approached, the parties had some discussions on their
own and then exchanged offers that the wife’s lawyer thought were
more reasonable.  But shortly before the trial date, the parties had
a nasty argument, which brought the negotiation to a “complete
halt.”72
On the day of trial, the husband shook with anxiety, appar-
ently coming to grips with the reality of the exposure of his “dirty
secrets.”  The wife was emotionally ready to go to trial, which may
have “spooked” the husband.  His lawyer also seemed agitated and
the lawyers negotiated with the “back and forth of horse trading”
based on what they thought that the judge would decide.  The wife
had demanded an offset for the husband’s misconduct so that she
would get about sixty percent of the estate and they ultimately
agreed that she would get about fifty-five percent.  The wife agreed
to waive maintenance in exchange for an adjustment in the prop-
erty settlement.  Having arrived in court at about 8:30 am, they
settled by noon.  The wife was satisfied with the result but was dis-
appointed that she did not have the catharsis of a trial.73
Some PN cases did not involve the personal antagonism or
hard-bargaining tactics illustrated in Cases 1 and 2.  In some cases
without these features, the parties nonetheless had the goal of max-
imizing outcomes based on zero-sum assumptions.  For example,
Case 3 was an example of “soft positional” negotiation, in which
the negotiators exchanged a series of offers to maximize their par-
tisan advantage but they maintained a cooperative approach in
handling the case.74  This was an employment discrimination case
that the defense counsel described as being “like a mediation with-
out the mediator.”  The defense counsel investigated the case
within the employer’s organization and, following his normal prac-
tice, he called his counterpart lawyer to get to know him.  In re-
sponse to his invitation for his counterpart to make a demand, the
plaintiff asked for $50,000.  The defense counsel responded with a
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See supra note 52 and accompanying text for discussion of “soft positional” negotiation.
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$5,000 offer and the parties exchanged several offers by mail.
When this did not result in a settlement, they decided to have a
meeting with the parties.  After an exchange of offers at the meet-
ing, they settled for $16,000 and an agreement that the employee
would not be rehired as well as a confidentiality agreement specifi-
cally prohibiting disclosures on social media.  Although each side
sought to maximize its financial outcome and the defendant’s rep-
resentative was upset at times because he felt that the company
should not have to pay much or anything to the plaintiff, the over-
all negotiation process was generally cooperative.75
Several cases involved a PN process but did not entail a purely
zero-sum assumption and partisans’ exclusive goal of maximization
of their interests.  This may have been, at least in part, because the
disputed issues were not monetary and the parties had other inter-
ests, especially about their relationships.  For example, in Case 4,
the mother in a post-divorce parenting dispute wanted the father to
go to counseling because he had outbursts of anger about the
mother in front of their daughters, but the father refused to go to
counseling.  The judge ordered the Domestic Relations Unit to do
an investigation and, in a settlement conference with the lawyers,
suggested that the report was favorable to the mother.  As a result,
the father agreed to go to counseling.  Apparently, there was not
much give-and-take exchange of offers after that as the father sim-
ply accepted the mother’s demand.76  Counseling generally is not a
zero-sum issue, because granting the mother’s demand for more
counseling for the father is not necessarily bad for the father.77
A labor grievance, in Case 5, illustrates a hard-fought negotia-
tion involving an exchange of offers but that also involved some
analysis of the negotiators’ interests to reach a positive-sum result.
Because of an employee’s arrest, he did not have a commercial
driver’s license, which was required for his job, so the company
fired him.  The union demanded that the employee be rehired and
receive $30,000 in back pay.  The company offered reinstatement
but no back pay.  In trying to resolve the dispute, the lawyers had
75 Interview, KC 02.
76 Interview, SL 01.
77 This is an example of “noncompetitive similarities,” where parties share non-zero-sum
interests. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 16.  There could be some zero-sum negotiation
about the amount of counseling, where the parties exchange offers to meet in the middle, though
this arguably might be considered to have non-zero-sum outcomes.  For further discussion of the
non-zero-sum nature of some aspects of divorce bargaining, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:  Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 542 (1994).
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“unproductive” discussions, as they were “fighting over every-
thing.”  The case was set for arbitration but when they arrived for
the hearing, it was clear that the hearing would take more than the
one day scheduled for the hearing, so the lawyers decided to nego-
tiate instead of starting the hearing.78
According to the company’s lawyer, the other side initially
“dug in its heels” and took a hard position.  The employee was in a
tough financial condition and was “desperate” to get money soon,
feeling that it would take too long to wait for an arbitration award.
The union was getting “a lot of bad PR on their website and
Facebook” and the union leaders had a strong interest in demon-
strating to their membership that they were “working hard” for
them, being “tough” in negotiation, and achieving “a result that no
one thought was possible.”  The company also had multiple inter-
ests.  Although the company’s lawyer believed that he had a strong
case and did not need to compromise very much, the company was
anticipating an upcoming negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement and it wanted to improve its relationship with the union
by settling this grievance.  The company representatives also felt
that it was important that a settlement of this grievance should not
set a precedent.  After an exchange of three to five offers by each
side, the parties agreed to the following conditions: the employee
would have a suspension (which was stayed); could return to work
if he satisfied certain conditions; would receive $10,000 in back pay,
and would have his seniority reinstated.  They also agreed that the
settlement would not set a precedent for future cases.  While all the
negotiators presumably analyzed the interests of each party, appar-
ently they did not explicitly discuss them with each other.79
Because the company was concerned about its relationship
with the union and the effect of the outcome of the grievance on
the upcoming contract negotiations, it was not in the company’s
interest to maximize a partisan goal of giving the employee as little
back pay as possible.  Presumably, the company executives be-
lieved that they could get more benefit from a good contract nego-
tiation than from paying less than $10,000 and antagonizing the
union.  Similarly, the executives presumably believed that the pro-
vision making the settlement non-precedent-setting was worth pos-
sibly paying a premium in settling this dispute.  The union
leadership probably also benefitted in its relationship with their
members by negotiating a favorable settlement.
78 Interview, SL 03.
79 Id.
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Even in some cases that are supposedly “only about the
money,” other interests may temper the parties’ goal of maximiz-
ing their results.  For example, in Case 6, the parties had an adver-
sarial dispute in which both parties wanted to maximize the
amount of property they received (or retained) but they settled be-
cause it gave them relief from the bitter litigation.  The trustor (the
parties’ father) had transferred to the defendant some property
from the trust prior to the father’s death, and the plaintiff claimed
that the transfer was improper.  The defendant’s lawyer located an
impressive witness who could completely discredit the plaintiff’s
factual claims and the lawyer argued that some of the plaintiff’s
causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations.  After
extensive litigation, the parties settled for about $15,000, which was
much less than the plaintiff’s original seven-figure demand.  They
ultimately compromised because the litigation was too burdensome
on them.  One brother was “losing sleep” because he worried so
much about the litigation and the legal costs.  The other brother
had to deal with an ailing wife and did not want to endure the
rigors of continued litigation.  Clearly, each party valued the emo-
tional relief from ending the litigation more than the potential fi-
nancial advantage from continuing it.80
In the PN process in Case 7, at least one party had some con-
cern about the other party’s interests.  The husband in a divorce
cared about the welfare of his wife and children and did not merely
attempt to maximize his own financial situation in resolving issues
of maintenance and allocation of debts.  He initiated the divorce
and his wife wanted to remain married.  Although he wanted to
protect his financial interests, he also wanted to maintain good re-
80 Interview, 09.  By definition, any time that parties reach agreement, they consider it to be
better than the no-agreement alternative.  Professor Russell Korobkin argues that as a theoreti-
cal matter, this is trivial because by using this perspective, virtually every agreement would be
considered to be creating value. See KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 114.  As a practical matter,
reaching agreement has real significance considering evidence that in the vast majority of cases
in which litigants go to trial, one of the parties would have been better off to accept the counter-
part’s last offer. See Randall L. Kiser et al., Let’s Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of
Decision Making in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 566
(2008) (finding that plaintiffs received an award less than or equal to the defendant’s last offer in
61.2% of the cases and defendants were ordered to pay more than the plaintiff’s last demand in
24.3% of the cases).  Merely saving the out-of-pocket cost of continued litigation can constitute a
major “created value” in negotiation.  Moreover, this calculation does not include the value of
time diverted from more productive activities, damaged relationships and reputations, increased
risks, and loss of peace of mind.  This value created in this case can be demonstrated by compar-
ing it with Case 3, the employment case settled through an exchange of offers without the in-
tense emotional costs present in Case 6. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
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lationships and he felt responsible for taking care of his family fi-
nancially during the divorce.  Even so, the parties felt a lot of
distrust toward each other, filed motions, and conducted most of
the negotiation in writing.  Before reaching an agreement, the par-
ties exchanged three to five offers dealing with varying combina-
tions of the amount and length of maintenance and responsibility
for the debts.  Presumably the husband would have tried to get
(and might have gotten) a more favorable deal if he hadn’t been
somewhat concerned about the wife.81
Case 8 was a contract dispute that was initially framed as a
zero-sum dispute about money but was converted into a positive-
sum dispute by adding an agreement for the buyer to increase the
amount of its purchases.  The buyer and seller had a long-term sup-
ply contract that provided for an adjustment of the price based on
certain contingencies.  The seller claimed that it was entitled to a
price increase under the contract but the buyer disagreed.  The par-
ties and lawyers had a series of phone calls and meetings to resolve
the dispute.  In the final meeting, where they settled the dispute,
both sides exchanged about three offers before reaching an agree-
ment under which the price was increased about half as much as
the seller initially demanded and the buyer agreed to increase the
amount of its purchases.82
This part demonstrates that negotiators may use a PN process
of taking positions (and usually exchanging offers) even when they
do not act in a hostile manner, use hard-bargaining tactics, define
the situation as having a zero-sum, or seek only to maximize their
own outcomes.  Although antagonistic relationships and hard-bar-
gaining tactics do occur in PN negotiations (as in Cases 1, 2, and 5),
some negotiators are quite cooperative when using a PN process
(as in Case 3).  And while many cases may appear to have zero-
sum structures, this is not inherent in the disputes.  Instead, it is a
function of how the negotiators define the disputes,83 as illustrated
in Cases 4 through 8.84
81 Interview, SL 04.
82 Interview, SL 05.
83 See GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 15 (“Whether a bargaining situation is an entirely distribu-
tive one or includes integrative possibilities is determined as much by how the negotiator ap-
proaches the situation as it is by the inherent nature of the bargaining context.”).
84 For additional examples of lawyers creating value in positional negotiations, see Heumann
& Hyman, supra note 62, at 280–81, 302.
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B. Interest-Based Negotiation
In defining interest-based negotiation (IBN) or an analogous
term,85 the negotiation texts generally refer to efforts to satisfy
both parties’ interests and create positive-sum outcomes amicably
and efficiently, though all the texts do not include all these charac-
teristics.  Focusing on the parties’ interests, one text states that this
approach “involves parties in an effort to jointly meet each others’
needs and satisfy [their] interests.”86  As a distinct but closely-re-
lated element in some definitions, some texts refer to a process of
“creating value” by developing positive-sum agreements.  For ex-
ample, one text states that this approach “take[s] advantage” of
situations where parties “structure a deal that will benefit the par-
ties more than merely dividing a single asset” because the parties
value aspects of the situation differently.87  Some texts also refer to
managing negotiation efficiently and/or amicably.88  The texts sum-
85 For various terms used to identify this model, see supra notes 54–56 and accompanying
text.  Although none of the texts use the term “interest-based,” it is commonly used.  A search of
the Westlaw “Journals and Law Reviews” database for similar terms found 576 documents refer-
ring to interest-based negotiation or bargaining.  This Article uses the term “interest-based nego-
tiation” because explicitly identifying parties’ interests is a key element of this model, as
described in this Part.
86 FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 42. See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12 (in a
cooperative/problem-solving style, negotiators seek to get reasonable results and satisfy oppo-
nents’ interests); GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 14–15 (“Instead of dividing a fixed quantity of re-
sources between them, an integrative bargaining context allows the parties to ‘problem-solve,’
i.e., devise mutually satisfying solutions.”); MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 3, at 117 (in-
tegrative negotiation takes “account of the real needs and interests of all parties”); RAU ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 133 (“a problem-solving strategy centers more on the parties’ underlying inter-
ests [than the parties’ positions, offers and counteroffers]”).  Professor Charles Craver describes
a “competitive/problem-solving” strategy in which lawyers use IBN techniques to advance their
clients interests by treating opponents respectfully and maximizing the opponents’ satisfaction as
long as they get favorable results for their clients. See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 15–18; see also
WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 59, 64–65.
87 KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 101. See also CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11 (in a cooperative/
problem-solving style, negotiators try to maximize joint returns); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3,
at 174 (“The overarching aim [of problem-solving] is to manage the distributive aspects of bar-
gaining efficiently and create value whenever possible.”); NELKEN, supra note 3, at 91 (The “ba-
sic premise [of an integrative approach] is that a negotiator can often do better by working
together with the other parties rather than assuming that the parties’ interests are necessarily
antagonistic.”); RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 133 (The goal of a problem-solving strategy is “to
search for trades and creative arrangements that can create value and to deal with distributive
issues as amicably and efficiently as possible.  This strategy does not depend upon there being
integrative possibilities to create value, but it certainly is well-suited to such negotiations.”) (em-
phasis in original).
88 CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12 (in a cooperative/problem-solving style, negotiators use
reason and are courteous, sincere, open, and trusting); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 174
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marize the techniques suggested in Getting to Yes, the modern “bi-
ble” of IBN, or list many other techniques with very little overlap
between the lists of techniques,89 suggesting that there is no con-
sensus that any particular techniques are essential to an IBN pro-
cess.  Analyzing the cases in this study demonstrates that it is very
hard to identify essential features of IBN, as described below.
In the early stages of data collection, my subjects had not de-
scribed cases that clearly fit the IBN model.  So I interviewed sev-
eral Collaborative lawyers to get accounts of cases to provide good
illustrations of IBN.  In addition to the Collaborative cases, six
non-Collaborative cases in this study displayed some elements of
IBN.  These cases dealt with property boundary, landlord-tenant,
foreclosure, divorce, business, and trust disputes.  In the non-Col-
laborative cases, the lawyers did not seem to purposely use an IBN
approach.  Rather, they presumably did what they thought would
be most effective in representing their clients.  Although all these
cases included monetary issues, they also involved significant non-
monetary issues requiring some behavioral coordination, which
may explain why the lawyers used some IBN procedures.  Resolu-
tion of these cases was more complex than simply making mone-
tary payments and thus PN or court adjudication presumably
would not have been as well suited to crafting careful solutions to
the parties’ problems.  For example, in the landlord-tenant and
foreclosure cases, the parties worked out arrangements for the ten-
ant and borrower, respectively, to stay in the properties for a pe-
riod of time and work out payment plans, which are better suited
to IBN than simply arranging evictions.90
Cases 9 and 10 provide good examples of a classic IBN pro-
cess.  Case 9 was a Collaborative divorce in which the wife had
serious alcohol problems that she initially denied.  Her behavior
jeopardized the children’s safety, particularly when she was driving
them in her car.  Following the norms of Collaborative practice, the
lawyers and parties met to negotiate in “four-way meetings.”  At
the first meeting, the lawyers “set the stage” by describing how the
(“The overarching aim [of problem-solving] is to manage the distributive aspects of bargaining
efficiently . . . .”); RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 133 (The goal a problem-solving strategy is “to
search for trades and creative arrangements that can create value and to deal with distributive
issues as amicably and efficiently as possible.”).
89 See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 11–12; FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 42–43; GIF-
FORD, supra note 3, at 89–97; KOROBKIN, supra note 3, at 116–27; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 130–60; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 224–48; NELKEN, supra note 3, at
97–102; RAU ET AL., supra note 3, at 133–47; WILLIAMS & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 59–60.
90 Interviews, KC 07, 08.
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process works, eliciting the parties’ intentions, setting a “roadmap”
for the process, and signing a “participation agreement” commit-
ting to the process.  The Collaborative process requires full disclo-
sure of relevant information and so the parties and lawyers made
arrangements to share financial information.  The husband’s lawyer
said that the husband’s “heart was in the right place” about the
wife as he wanted her to maintain a good relationship with the chil-
dren and for the children to be safe.  The lawyer said that if they
were in litigation, she would have “tried to prove how bad [the
wife] was instead of trying to support her.”91
The husband’s lawyer was not privy to conversations between
the wife and her lawyer, but she believes that they had extensive
conversations to get her to acknowledge her alcohol problems.  In
four-way meetings, they also talked about the mental health re-
sources she might use and ways to arrange for help that she would
find acceptable.  A major challenge was to arrange for an alcohol
assessment that the wife would not feel was too risky or judgmen-
tal.  They agreed that the mental health professionals would be in a
Collaborative “container,” i.e., protected by an agreement that the
professionals could not be called to testify in court.  With this
agreement, the wife participated in a formal alcohol assessment
showing that she had alcohol problems.  The parties and lawyers
jointly considered what treatment would be appropriate and she
underwent this treatment as agreed.92
The lawyers were concerned about how the children were
dealing with their mother’s issues and so the parties hired a child
specialist.  The child specialist met with the children to understand
their views and then “[fed] them back” to the mother in a construc-
tive way.  The specialist told the mother about the children’s
problems caused by her drinking and also educated the children
about safety.93
The mother wanted to spend equal time with the children but
her alcohol use made it difficult for them to be with her at first.
The parties and lawyers considered various options to deal with the
problem.  They agreed that the children would initially spend short
supervised periods of time with the mother but not “overnights” at
her house.  They set up a process for visitation supervision, includ-
ing monitoring and reporting on the visitation.  They set conditions
for removing supervision and created a “safety net” to reinstate the
91 Interview, SL 12.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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supervision if needed.  They also arranged for the mother’s thera-
pist and the child specialist to talk with each other periodically.
The parties resolved all the issues in the divorce and the husband’s
lawyer (and presumably her counterpart and the parties) believed
that the agreements were appropriate.94
Case 10 is another illustration of a classic IBN process.  It in-
volved a Collaborative divorce in which spousal support was a cen-
tral issue.  The husband had a high-income job and the wife did not
earn very much because she was just starting to develop a business.
In the initial consultation with the wife, her lawyer asked her what
was most important to her.  The wife wanted to have enough
spousal support to transition back into the work world.  She had
some credentials in a certain field but had not worked in that field
for quite some time.  So she needed time to get stabilized in the
workplace.  She thought that her husband would be willing to pro-
vide support if he knew that he did not have to pay it “forever.”
She also knew that he was concerned about his job stability.  He
was high in the hierarchy of his company and believed that it is
easier to “get knocked off from the top.”95
The wife’s lawyer called the husband’s lawyer and set up a
four-way meeting where the lawyers described how the Collabora-
tive process works.  They asked the parties to say why they chose
Collaborative Law and what goals and challenges they anticipated
in the process.  They listed information that would be needed and
decided who would gather it.  In a series of meetings, they dis-
cussed the issues, which the wife’s lawyer compared to “peeling an
onion, layer by layer.”  She said that the assets were easy to divide
and they agreed on a fifty-fifty split.  They also agreed easily about
paying for the children’s college costs by using a certain asset.96
Spousal support was the most challenging issue.  The parties
and lawyers discussed what work the wife would do.  Would she
start in a new direction?  Did she need retraining?  Did she need a
vocational expert?  How much would she earn?  They also dis-
cussed the stability of the husband’s company and the prospect of
his staying employed.  What if he lost a job through no fault of his
own?  How might it affect support?  They had an open discussion
of these questions, “looking at the situation from as many angles as
they could come up with.”97
94 Id.
95 Interview, SL 10.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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The wife also discussed the situation with her lawyer privately.
The wife knew that the husband was “terrified of being pinned
down” and suggested the idea of setting support as a percentage of
the husband’s income.  She and her lawyer discussed all the pitfalls
of such an approach, such as the risks of her husband losing his job.
The wife said that her husband is a good employee who is a
“workaholic” and “rises to the top.”  She thought that the only way
that he would lose his job would be a downturn in the company.  If
the “bottom did fall out,” she said that there would be enough as-
sets so that she would be okay.  The parties ultimately decided that
the husband would pay a percentage of his income, including bo-
nuses, for a period of five to ten years.  They also made an arrange-
ment to take care of the wife financially if the husband became
disabled.  As a result of this negotiation, the provision in the di-
vorce agreement regarding support was unusually detailed.  The
wife’s lawyer said that the lawyers always focused on the parties’
needs and goals, which “made such a difference” in helping them
deal with their fears during the process.98
In Cases 9 and 10, the parties discussed their goals, arranged
for an exchange of information, considered a range of options for
deciding difficult issues, and reached agreements that satisfied their
interests.  Although the wife in Case 9 probably struggled through
the process and would have preferred to avoid some of the interim
agreements for supervised visitation of her children, she probably
also came to appreciate that these agreements ultimately did satisfy
her interest in maintaining healthy relationships with her children.
The parties in both cases created value as compared with a tradi-
tional divorce process.  In Case 9, the process strengthened the par-
ties’ relationships instead of engaging in an adversarial conflict that
presumably would have damaged the relationships.  The wife
traded her denial of alcoholic problems for an improved relation-
ship with her children.  The husband traded the instability of deal-
ing with his wife for greater confidence in her parenting.  The
combined value for the parties was obviously much greater than if
they had engaged in litigotiation, fighting over the wife’s access to
the children.  In Case 10, the parties traded the certainty of a defi-
nite amount of maintenance for having an agreement that provided
what they felt was a fair sharing of risks and benefits, which the
parties valued more.
Case 11 illustrates a non-Collaborative case using an IBN pro-
cess.  It involved a dispute between two adjacent property owners
98 Id.
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about alleged acquisition of property by adverse possession.  After
the defendant’s lawyer did a basic investigation into the facts and
the law, he determined the likely outcome at trial.  He said that his
goal in every negotiation is to reach an agreement that both sides
can live with even though they “may not love or even particularly
like it,” which is better than expensive litigation.  He talked with
his client, explaining possible ways to resolve the dispute to see
what would be acceptable.99
Then he called the plaintiff’s lawyer and arranged to meet with
him.  He explained why he thought that plaintiff’s counsel had an
erroneous understanding about the law and unrealistic expecta-
tions about the outcome if they went to trial.  They talked about
their clients’ general goals and that it was in both their interests to
settle the matter rather than incur more litigation costs.  They
talked about the clients’ expectations, how things might go in the
negotiation, and what the clients might accept.  The defense coun-
sel explained that his client had to have legal title to the property.
Although the plaintiff originally indicated that he needed legal ti-
tle, it turned out that the plaintiff’s top priority was having access
to the property and his interests could be accommodated without
getting legal title.  The parties also had important interests in defin-
ing the boundaries; resolving issues about curbs, a decorative wall,
a driveway, and landscaping; and settling on a reasonable amount
of damages.  Both lawyers worked hard to convince their clients
that pursuing litigation was not in their best interest.  The lawyers
reached a general understanding in principle, which was not based
on an exchange of offers.  After the parties approved the agree-
ment in principle, they exchanged offers by refining each other’s
offers.  This led to an agreement about the amount of money that
the defendant would pay, what would be done about various as-
pects of the property, and who would carry out certain tasks.100
In this case, the negotiation process generally fit the character-
istics of an IBN even though the lawyers presumably were not self-
consciously using the process as Collaborative lawyers do.  Here,
the lawyers explicitly discussed their clients’ overlapping and con-
flicting interests, developed an agreement in principle that ad-
dressed these interests, and then worked out the details through an
exchange of counter-offers to refine the final agreement.  Presuma-
99 Interview, BC 03.
100 Id.
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bly, the agreement satisfied the parties’ interests more than the op-
tions they considered but did not agree to.101
Prosecutors interviewed in this study who handle cases in drug
court and mental health courts—sometimes called “problem-solv-
ing courts”102—said that they often use an IBN process in those
cases.103  A prosecutor who handles drug court cases said that she
and the defense counsel often have in-depth discussions reflecting
their shared interest in helping the defendants and keeping them
out of the criminal justice system.104  Another prosecutor said that
in mental health court, she meets with the defendants along with a
team of professionals and later with the judge.  The goal in these
cases is to improve people’s lives so that they can “graduate” and
avoid future offenses rather than to put them in jail.  In these nego-
tiations, they discuss how the defendants are doing, whether they
are complying with treatment regimes, and whether they need
sanctions.  If there are problems (such as an arrest, positive drug
test, or non-compliance with court orders), they discuss what is the
best thing to do for the defendants.105
Although the negotiations in Cases 9 through 11 and in the
problem-solving courts fit the general IBN model, it was hard to
categorize some of the other cases.  To some extent, what is consid-
ered essential to be an IBN case may be a matter of one’s theoreti-
cal preference.  In my view, the only essential feature of this type
of negotiation is a significant effort to satisfy explicitly-identified
interests of both parties.  Thus this Article uses the term “interest-
based negotiation.”106
101 Although a process centered on the exchange of offers generally does not fit in an IBN
model, exchanging offers is not necessarily inconsistent with it.  According to Getting to Yes,
exchanging offers is not inconsistent with an IBN process if it follows identification of interests,
generation of options for mutual gain, and discussion of fairness. FISHER & URY, supra note 15,
at 153.
102 For a general description of problem-solving courts, see Paul Holland, Lawyering and
Learning in Problem-Solving Courts, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 185 (2010).
103 These lawyers described these cases generally but did not provide detailed accounts like
the cases in this study.
104 Interview, BC 08.
105 Interview, BC 09.
106 Explicitly focusing on the parties’ interests generally is related to an effort to create value
by taking advantage of differences in the parties’ interests about the issues.  As a practical mat-
ter, however, it is easier to observe whether negotiators explicitly discuss their interests than
whether their negotiations create value.  Creating value depends on negotiators’ relative assess-
ments of various options, which are subjective, are not necessarily consciously considered and
often are not candidly disclosed.  For example, a criminal defense lawyer said that he sometimes
reaches agreements with prosecutors without much discussion because they know each others’
interests in the case. See Interview, SL 07.  Even if both negotiators in such cases accurately
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Although IBN processes can be efficient and amicable, this is
not necessarily the case and these are not essential characteristics
of this type of negotiation.  For example, the parties in Cases 9 and
10 apparently spent substantial resources and they presumably
would have spent a lot more time and money if the parties did not
settle after extensive negotiations.  Although the lawyers in Cases 9
and 11 worked together cooperatively, the parties in those cases
did not experience the negotiations as completely amicable.  Thus,
while many academics and practitioners in everyday conversation
think of IBN as being a friendly process (and often assume that a
PN process is unfriendly), this does not seem to be a necessary or
distinguishing feature of IBN.
Some cases in this study display some but not all of the theo-
retical elements of IBN.  Consider Case 7, described above.107  In
that case, a husband in a divorce was concerned about the welfare
of his wife and children and not merely maximizing his own finan-
cial situation.  The lawyers discussed the parties’ interests, which
presumably helped them negotiate.  Although the lawyers started
on a “good footing” with each other, the parties were very anxious
about the financial arrangements and filed motions for temporary
court orders to govern the situation while the case was pending.
Both lawyers tried to focus their clients on negotiation, and they
reached an agreement on temporary issues without a hearing.
Before reaching an agreement, the parties exchanged three to five
offers dealing with varying combinations of the amount and length
of maintenance and responsibility for the debts.108
Is this an example of an IBN process?  On one hand, the law-
yers discussed the parties’ interests and the husband was concerned
about the wife’s welfare to some extent.  On the other hand, the
parties apparently had a tense relationship during the process and
reached agreement only after a considerable exchange of offers.
What would make the process clearly positional or interest-based?
Would it matter if satisfying both parties’ interests was the primary
consideration in the negotiation?  What difference does it make
that the lawyers apparently were focused on satisfying both parties’
interests but the parties themselves may have had much less con-
cern for each other?  Would it make a difference if only one party
was concerned about the other’s interest?  Is a critical factor what
assess the options and choose one that satisfies the interests of both sides, this does not fit the
common conceptions of an IBN approach.
107 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
108 Id.
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the negotiators thought or said when they exchanged offers?  For
example, would it matter if the negotiators crafted their offers to
maximize their side’s gain (hoping that their offers would be the
bare minimum needed to get the other side to accept) or to accom-
modate the other side’s real interests?109  Although it might be
easy to distinguish these two motivations in some negotiations, in
many cases, it would be hard to separate them.  Does it matter how
much of the negotiation involved an exchange of offers?  For ex-
ample, in Case 11, it appears that the exchange of offers may have
been a relatively small part of the negotiation, working out details
of an agreement in principle.  In Case 7, perhaps the parties gave
lip service to addressing each others’ interests but most of the pro-
cess involved exchanges of partisan offers.  Would it have made a
difference if the negotiators considered a range of options instead
of exchanging offers?  Would it have made a difference if the
agreement “created value” for the parties?
In Case 5, involving a labor grievance, apparently there was
little or no direct discussion of the parties’ interests between the
opposing parties although the agreement was obviously tailored to
satisfy the interests of the negotiators.110  Should this be considered
as an IBN case?  The relationships between the opposing sides
were extremely adversarial as the lawyers “[fought] over every-
thing.”  At the beginning of the final negotiation, the company law-
yer said that the union initially “dug in its heels” and took a hard
position.  After a difficult negotiation involving an exchange of
three to five offers by each side, the parties reached an agreement
that was tailored to the interests of the employee, union, and com-
pany.111  Again, it is hard to determine whether this was an IBN
case or, if not, what changes in the process would make it fit into
the IBN model.  Although there was apparently little direct discus-
sion of the negotiators’ interests, the negotiators presumably devel-
oped theories about the other side’s interests, which probably were
pretty accurate.  Would it have made a difference if there was an
explicit discussion of the parties’ interests?  Would it be enough if
the negotiators had a certain level of concern for the other side’s
interests in crafting offers even if they did not discuss the interests
explicitly?  Would it have made a difference if the negotiators con-
sidered a range of options, such as in a brainstorming process?
109 This approach would be an example of what Professor Charles Craver calls a “competitive
/ problem-solving style.” See supra note 86.
110 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
111 Id.
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Would it make a difference if the tone of the negotiation was more
friendly?
These questions illustrate a fundamental conceptual confusion
about the meaning of IBN, a cornerstone of contemporary negotia-
tion theory.  This is reflected in loose talk by some academics and
practitioners who seem to consider a process as IBN if the negotia-
tors are friendly or make even cursory reference to parties’ inter-
ests.112  Professors Milton Heumann and Jonathan Hyman
observed similar confusion in their study of New Jersey lawyers.
Although lawyers in that study reported that, on average, they
used IBN in up to 33% of their civil cases, the researchers “sel-
dom” heard “stories about the interests of the parties” when ob-
serving actual settlement negotiations.113  Moreover, in interviews
about the cases, the lawyers described “little about the underlying
real-world interests of their clients and the opposing parties.”114
The researchers found that “[e]ven the word ‘need’ was turned to
positional, not problem-solving, use,” typically referring to “what
dollar amount would be sufficient to settle the case.”115
Part of the confusion about IBN may be due to the lack of a
concept for a generally-recognized alternative to an IBN or PN
process.  The following part describes what I have called “ordinary
legal negotiation,” which may provide a better fit for some cases
that people might consider as IBN.
C. Ordinary Legal Negotiation
An initial purpose of this study was to find real-life examples
of a negotiation model I theorized as “ordinary legal negotiation”
(OLN).116  In this model, lawyers try to reach a reasonable agree-
ment based on shared norms, which typically are the expected out-
112 Some people probably consider, without much reflection, that “soft positional negotia-
tion”—a friendly version of PN—is interest-based negotiation. See supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text for description of this approach.
113 Heumann & Hyman, supra note 63, at 255, 306.  The average response of lawyers was that
they used problem-solving negotiation (a term used synonymously with IBN) entirely or almost
entirely in 16% of cases, and a combination of PN and IBN methods was used in 17% of cases.
Id. at 255.
114 Id. at 306.
115 Id.
116 Lande, supra note 16, at 112–21; John Lande, Lessons from Teaching Students to Negotiate
Like a Lawyer, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 9–10 (2013).  The term “ordinary” follows
Kritzer’s term “ordinary litigation,” referring to relatively routine, “everyday” cases. See
KRITZER, supra note 17, at 5–13.  Lawyers probably use OLN quite commonly, though this study
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comes in court or normal agreements in similar cases.117  The
process resembles everyday conversation more than it does a dia-
logue focusing on an exchange of offers or an analysis of how to
satisfy the parties’ interests, as in the PN and IBN models.118  This
model is based on the empirical research of Herbert Krtizer and
Lynn Mather and her colleagues:
Social scientist Herbert Kritzer studied ordinary civil litigation
and found a very common pattern where “the discussions con-
cerning damages may be less a series of offers and counteroffers
and more a process of exchange of information intended to
place the instant cases in the context of presumed going rates.”
Consistent with Kritzer’s description of this approach, Professor
Lynn Mather and her colleagues’ research found that many di-
vorce lawyers in Maine and New Hampshire followed a “norm
of reasonableness” in negotiation.  Under this norm, lawyers re-
alistically analyze the typical legal outcomes in their cases and
advise clients to accept “settlement close to the typical result.”
Thus lawyers said that they do not start with “extreme” or “ri-
diculous” positions that are “inconsistent with what ‘everyone
knows’ about divorce.”119
cannot compare the frequency of its use with other models.  The term is not intended to suggest
any normative implication that OLN is normal or preferable to other models.
117 Lande, supra note 16, at 118–20; Lande, supra note 115, at 9–10.  There are analogs to
OLN in dispute resolution theory.  Fisher and Ury recommend using objective criteria as a possi-
ble element of their concept of principled negotiation, a form of interest-based negotiation. See
FISHER & URY, supra note 15, at 81–94.  They identify numerous forms of objective criteria,
including court outcomes along with market values, professional standards, and tradition, among
others. Id. at 85.  Similarly, Professor Donald Gifford describes a cooperative negotiation strat-
egy as usually relying on norms or objective standards. GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 16.  Professor
Ellen Waldman distinguishes between what she calls “norm-educating” and “norm-generating”
mediation models.  In a “norm-educating” mediation, mediators provide information about rele-
vant legal or other norms to help parties make decisions, in contrast to “norm-generating” medi-
ations, where the mediators and parties refer to the parties’ interests or other factors that they
consider relevant. See Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A
Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 718, 730–32 (1997).
118 In Kritzer’s study of negotiation in ordinary litigation, only 15% of lawyers reported ex-
changing three or more offers, in contrast with the image of PN, where lawyers start with ex-
treme offers and exchange multiple offers before reaching agreement. See KRITZER, supra note
18, at 37.
119 Lande, supra note 115, at 9 (citing KRITZER, supra note 18, at 121; LYNN MATHER ET AL.,
DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 48–56, 127–28
(2001) (footnotes omitted)). See also GENN, supra note 36, at 164–65 (describing “reasonable”
or “cooperative” negotiation approach in personal injury cases where both lawyers “know what
the claim is worth” and try to reach a “realistic” settlement); LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING OR TRIAL? 139–42 (1979) (finding that criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors classified
cases based on the strength of the prosecutors’ case (being “dead bang” or having “reasonable
doubt”) and the seriousness of the case (being either “light” or “serious”) and negotiated ac-
cordingly); PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL
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In an OLN process, the lawyers would advocate their respec-
tive clients’ interests by trying to get a deal that is at least as
favorable to them as the typical settlement or likely court result
and is acceptable to both sides.  The norms generally used in
OLN—such as the “going rates” and “typical results” described by
Kritzer and Mather—are different from the parties’ interests.120
For example, in Case 10, a divorcing couple’s agreement to calcu-
late spousal support as a percentage of the husband’s income was
based on how they could satisfy both spouses’ interests in financial
security, not expectations about what a court would decide if they
tried the case.121  Moreover, OLN is distinct from “soft positional”
negotiation, as in Case 3, where the negotiators had a cooperative
relationship but exchanged a series of offers to close the gap be-
tween their sharply different initial positions rather than focusing
on a shared assessment of the case.122
[Thus, OLN] contrasts with IBN, which focuses primarily on
what the parties actually need, rather than making adjustments
to the relevant norms.  Indeed, in both IBN and PN, the negoti-
ators focus on the parties’ interests although these two models
differ about whether the negotiators seek to satisfy both parties’
interests (i.e., IBN) or only each party’s own partisan interests
(i.e., PN).  In IBN, negotiators discuss the parties’ interests and
options for satisfying the interests whereas PN negotiators ex-
change a series of offers where each side tries to pressure the
other side to accept an agreement maximizing its own interests.
If negotiators are primarily oriented to making decisions by ref-
erence to applicable norms, then making adjustments to the
norms based on some exchange of offers and/or reference to
COURT 106–08 (1978) (finding that prosecutors and defense counsel in Alameda County, Cali-
fornia, jointly try to “settle the facts” to reach fair agreements based on generally-accepted
“case-worth norms” considering the likely result at trial as well as other factors such as “the
offender’s age, record, character, motivations, and likelihood of recidivism”); James B. Atleson,
The Legal Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The Settlement of Injunction Actions,
23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41, 61–63 (1989) (finding that, in cases involving injunctions against pick-
eting, labor and management lawyers in Buffalo, New York, generally followed norms against
seeking “too much” in court and unreasonably refusing to settle); Nancy Schultz, Law and Nego-
tiation:  Necessary Partners or Strange Bedfellows?, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 105, 126
(2013) (survey finding that 41.3% of lawyers said that the law plays a “primary role in determin-
ing the outcomes of [their] negotiations”).
120 For further discussion of norms used in OLN, see infra notes 138–41 and accompanying
text.
121 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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parties’ interests does not make the process PN or IBN, nor is
OLN simply a combination of these two familiar models.123
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical distinctions between the three
models.
Table 1. Goals, Assumptions, Process, and Use of Legal Norms
in Positional, Ordinary Legal, and Interest-Based
Negotiation by Lawyers124
Positional Ordinary Legal Interest-Based
Negotiation Negotiation Negotiation
Lawyers’ maximum partisan good result for their good result for both
Goals advantage for their clients parties
clients
Key negotiation is zero- most cases can be lawyers can achieve
Assump- sum and clients settled based on optimal, positive-sum
tions must take tough legal norms, which results by jointly
positions to achieve can produce good analyzing clients’
their goals and results and help interests and a range of
avoid being preserve lawyers’ options
disadvantaged and parties’
relationships
Process lawyers exchange lawyers exchange lawyers and parties
offers, starting with information to explicitly identify parties’
extreme positions, figure out an interests and numerous
and make small and appropriate result options to select the
slow concessions given the norms in option best satisfying the
their legal practice parties’ interests
community
Use of lawyers use legal lawyers use legal lawyers use legal norms
Legal norms in tactical norms as the initial to calculate their “best
Norms arguments to and principal alternative to a
achieve the most standard in negotiated agreement” to
favorable partisan negotiation, which serve as an outer limit on
result, ideally far may be adjusted acceptable agreements
exceeding legal due to parties’ (adjusted by factors such
norms rather than needs and other as transaction costs, risk
accepting legal factors preferences, and
norms as their goal concerns about privacy,
reputation, and
relationships)
123 Lande, supra note 115, at 10 (emphasis in original).  When lawyers use norms in OLN
cases, they try to persuade each other how the legal norms should be applied in their case.  This
contrasts with a PN process, where lawyers use legal arguments to gain advantage by undermin-
ing their counterparts’ confidence in the favorability of the likely court outcome.
124 Lande, supra note 16, at 120.
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In this study, eleven cases involved an OLN approach to a sig-
nificant degree in resolving the ultimate issues.  In some of these
cases, it appeared that negotiators predominately used OLN and in
other cases, negotiators used a combination of approaches.  In all
six of the criminal cases in this study, the lawyers used OLN; two of
these cases appeared to involve other approaches in addition to
OLN.  Three divorce cases included OLN, all in combination with
other approaches.  The other two cases involved landlord-tenant
and foreclosure disputes, which also involved other approaches.
Case 12, in which the defendant was arrested for attempting to
sell marijuana, is an illustration of an OLN process.  The defendant
was on probation at the time and his probation was revoked due to
his arrest, so he was in prison while this case was pending.  The
prosecutor followed her normal procedure by analyzing case to
make a “baseline decision what the case is worth.”  Her goals were
to have the defendant take responsibility for his actions and ar-
range for an appropriate disposition.  In analyzing this case, she
considered the facts, whether the evidence was strong enough to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s criminal
history, whether he was an addict, the level of charges, and the fact
that he was in prison.  This case involved a confidential informant
and the prosecutor was reluctant to “burn” the informant by dis-
closing his identity, which would have been necessary if they went
to trial.125
The prosecutor routinely includes a plea offer along with the
discovery she sends to defense counsel.  She said that she has been
handling cases like this long enough to know what the judges are
likely to do and she often makes offers for less than what she
thinks the judge would sentence.  In this case, she thought that if
the defendant would have been convicted at trial, he would have
gotten a sentence of ten to twelve years in prison.  She knew that
he was going to prison anyway because of the parole violation and
she recommended a three-year sentence to be served concurrently
with a sentence for his probation violation.  The public defender
responded that the defendant did not want to accept the plea offer.
She assumed that the defense counsel probably told him that if he
was convicted at trial, he had a big risk of sentence enhancement
because he had two prior drug convictions.  On the morning of
trial, the defense counsel called to say that the defendant would
125 Interview, BC 08.
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accept the prosecutor’s original plea offer without making a
counter-offer, which she said was not unusual.126
This case involved two experienced lawyers who had a good
relationship with each other and a good understanding of what to
expect if the case went to trial.  Although the defendant apparently
was motivated to maximize his result (by minimizing his sentence),
the prosecutor focused on well-accepted norms, including but not
limited to the likely court decision.  Although the defense counsel
presumably wanted to get the best possible deal for his client, he
probably also considered local norms for cases like this.  Some peo-
ple might not consider this case as one that would involve negotia-
tion because the defendant did not make a counter-offer, though it
obviously resulted in an agreement about the ultimate issues in the
case.127
Case 13 involved an OLN process with a lot more effort de-
voted to negotiation than Case 12.  In this case, a sixteen year-old
defendant who, along with two co-defendants, was charged with
armed robbery for committing three robberies in two days.  The
evidence against the defendants was overwhelming as they were
found with the clothing, masks, guns, and money from the robber-
ies and there was compelling video and audiotape evidence.  The
defense counsel had a good relationship with the prosecutor and,
soon after he took the case, he called her to let her know that he
was representing the defendant.  Within ten days of taking the case,
he started to negotiate and he continued to try to negotiate
throughout the case.  He thought that he and the prosecutor both
were trying to achieve a fair result, though they presumably had
different perspectives about what was fair in this case.  He assumed
that she would describe her goals as protecting society from dan-
gerous individuals and deterring potential robbers.  Presumably,
the defense counsel wanted to minimize his client’s sentence and
believed that would be fair.128
The case was challenging because a co-defendant had already
entered a guilty plea and accepted a fifteen-year sentence.  That
deal became the standard for the prosecutor as she would have to
justify in her own mind why she should give a better deal to the
defendant in this case when the facts seemed to be the same.  She
initially made the same offer of a fifteen-year sentence to this de-
fendant, but he let the offer expire.  The defense counsel tried to
126 Id.
127 For discussion of the definition of negotiation, see supra Part III.
128 Interview, BC 10.
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think of distinctions that would persuade the prosecutor to accept a
shorter sentence.  For example, he noted that his client was a year
younger than the defendant who pled guilty.  Only one of the de-
fendants held the gun, but since they were masked, it was hard to
tell who had the gun.  The lawyer tried to undermine the prosecu-
tor’s confidence that his client was the gunman by asking for DNA
and fingerprint testing.  He also arranged for his client to give evi-
dence to the prosecutor about another crime.  Although the prose-
cutor already knew the information that the defendant provided,
meeting with him showed that he was a “charming young man”
trying to help the authorities, distinguishing him from the other
two defendants.129
The defense counsel engaged in some “brinksmanship,” letting
the case proceed until the eve of trial.  In the final negotiation, he
cited other cases with outcomes more in line with the ten-year sen-
tence he asked for.  The prosecutor offered eleven years, which was
only slightly more than the minimum ten-year sentence but was
significantly less than the fifteen years that the other defendant
agreed to and much less than his client might have gotten if he was
convicted at trial and got consecutive sentences for each robbery.
The defense counsel thought that his good relationship with the
prosecutor influenced her decision to meet with the defendant and
contributed to her decision on the deal she finally offered.  The
defendant accepted the prosecutor’s offer of the eleven-year
sentence.130
In Cases 12 and 13, the lawyers had a lot of experience and
good relationships with their counterparts.  They knew the norms
for their cases and their perspectives were framed around those
norms.  In Case 13, unlike in Case 12, the lawyers had extensive
communications throughout the case and much of the interaction
was directly related to negotiation.  In the final negotiation, there
was only one offer and one counter-offer, which was accepted.
Case 14 illustrates a case in which the parties used OLN based
on norms in setting child support.  This divorce case involved a hus-
band who recently lost a professional-level job and a wife who had
mostly worked at home taking care of their children but had re-
cently started working part-time cleaning houses.  Although the
wife wanted the divorce, she still valued her relationship with her
husband and his role as the father of her children, and she did not
want to hurt him.  The husband wanted to maintain a good rela-
129 Id.
130 Id.
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tionship with his wife and he also wanted to minimize his financial
cost.131
The wife’s lawyer said that he had worked with the husband’s
lawyer many times and they had a good relationship of mutual re-
spect.  He said that the husband’s lawyer is fair, easy to work with,
and responsive.  They do not “play hide the ball” or put on “dog
and pony shows” for their clients.  They advocate their clients’ in-
terests and also look for solutions that both sides would consider to
be reasonable.132
The parties readily reached an agreement on the parenting is-
sues but were “worlds apart” on the financial issues.  The hus-
band’s loss of his job “threw a wrench” into the negotiation about
child support.  The husband had applied for many jobs, some of
which he was overqualified for.  He was offered several jobs but
turned them down because they did not pay enough or were too
speculative.  He had been making about $65,000 in his prior job
and received a $38,000 offer, which apparently was the highest of-
fer he had gotten by the time they resolved the case.133
After the lawyers exchanged thorough responses to each
other’s discovery requests, the wife’s lawyer sent a settlement pro-
posal to the other side but they were still far apart.  They decided
to have a settlement conference with the lawyers and the parties.
The lawyers agreed that “there was only so much money to go
around” and the case was not going to trial, so they needed to re-
solve the issues through negotiation.  Several days before this
meeting, the wife’s lawyer met with her to discuss what she would
or would not accept.  The wife agreed to drop a claim for mainte-
nance in exchange for receiving certain assets, so they expected
that the only difficult issue would be child support.134
At the meeting, the parties considered whether one would buy
the other out of the house and, after some discussion, the couple
decided to sell the house.  They worked out arrangements for re-
pairs needed to make it marketable.  In the negotiation of child
support, the wife’s calculations imputed the husband’s income as
$65,000 and the husband’s calculations assumed his income to be
$40,000.  They ended up with an agreement that was close to split-
ting the difference between the two figures.  The discussion was
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generally very civil and there were only a few moments where peo-
ple were frustrated.135
Negotiators in Case 14 used different negotiation approaches
for different issues.  Initially, the parties used a PN approach in
dealing with financial issues when they exchanged offers that were
far apart.  The negotiation about the house was an IBN approach,
where they considered several options and agreed on one that
worked best for both of them.  The agreement on parenting issues
was the result of an OLN process, with little or no dispute.136  The
negotiators also used an OLN process to deal with child support,
which did involve a dispute.  They relied on legal norms based on
legal child support tables and rules about imputing income.  They
also followed a time-honored legal norm of “splitting the differ-
ence” to reach an agreement.  Although there was some tension,
especially early in the case, the parties and lawyers generally acted
respectfully and negotiated using normal conversation.
In the preceding OLN cases, the lawyers relied on their own
understandings about legal norms.  In several cases in this study,
lawyers used the norms provided in judicial settlement conferences
where judges identified likely court outcomes, which prompted the
lawyers to focus the negotiations around the judges’ predictions or
recommendations.  For example, in Case 4, the judge in a bitter
divorce case indicated in a settlement conference that a father
should get counseling and he agreed as a result of the judge’s rec-
ommendation.137  In a case involving a dispute over whether roy-
alty income from the husband’s work would be considered marital
property, a settlement conference judge gave his recommendation
and then, with relatively little discussion, the parties agreed to a
figure close to the recommendation.138
In all the OLN cases in this study (or portions of cases where
negotiators used an OLN approach), the negotiations focused on
norms as the central standard for negotiation.  In virtually all of
these cases, the norms were legal norms based on expectations
about the likely result if the cases had been tried.139  In some cases,
135 Id.
136 Although the spouses apparently reached the agreement about parenting issues on their
own, the lawyers presumably needed to agree and would have raised objections if they saw
problems.
137 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
138 Interview, BC 02.
139 Although counterpart lawyers regularly profess differing expectations about the likely
court outcomes, some counterparts explicitly agree.  For example, in Heumann and Hyman’s
study, in 21 of 131 cases described by the lawyer-interviewees, the counterparts had a similar
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the norms in the OLN portion of the negotiation were based on
typical business practices.140  For example, in Case 8, which in-
volved a dispute over the pricing provision of a long-term sales
contract, negotiators referred to the typical prices in the applicable
market.141  In several criminal cases, the lawyers also considered
various factors that were considered relevant in the local legal cul-
ture such as the defendants’ ages, life circumstances, attitude, and
degree of cooperation.  The lawyers’ goals were to reach what they
considered to be a reasonable result under the circumstances and
given the applicable norms.142  The OLN parts of the negotiation
involved everyday conversation rather than exchanges of offers or
analysis of interests.
Lawyers are more likely to use an OLN approach to resolve
the ultimate issues in a case when (1) the lawyers know each other,
(2) they believe that their counterparts are experienced and com-
petent, (3) they want to maintain reputations for reasonableness,
(4) there is a relatively clear body of applicable legal or other
norms, (5) the facts of a case can be readily likened to arguably
comparable cases, (6) there is not enough at stake to justify an all-
out adversarial battle, and (7) using an OLN process is considered
a legitimate negotiation method in the particular legal culture.  Of
course, not all of these conditions would be necessary for lawyers
to use an OLN approach.143
In addition to cases where lawyers used an OLN approach to
resolve some or all of the ultimate issues, in virtually every case, the
lawyers used an OLN approach to reach agreement on the count-
less things they needed to coordinate.  To start, consider the seem-
ingly trivial matter of returning phone calls or emails.  Whether
one’s counterparts do so makes a big difference to lawyers in the
study, who really appreciate it when their counterparts do so and
view of the likely outcome. See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 63, at 289.  Presumably, in a
substantial additional proportion of cases, the difference in the counterparts’ assessments was
fairly small and easily negotiable.
140 Negotiators may use non-legal norms such as “typical rates or provisions in particular
types of agreements, such as sales, leases, or licensing agreements in specified markets.”  Lande,
supra note 115, at 9 n.32.
141 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 124–29 (Cases 12 and 13) and accompanying text.
143 For example, Case 13 involved a high-stakes case with a minimum ten-year sentence, but
the lawyers presumably chose to use this approach because the other factors in the list were
present. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.  Even when lawyers have not worked
with each other prior to a given case, many act cooperatively and are likely to use an OLN
approach when other factors are present.
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resent it when they do not.144  Lawyers also routinely coordinate
their actions in exchanging information, both through informal ex-
changes as well as arrangements for formal discovery procedures.
Similarly, lawyers coordinate in giving time extensions, exchanging
papers, scheduling depositions, making arrangements related to le-
gal motions, engaging in required consultations, and jointly prepar-
ing documents required by court rules.  Although many lawyers
routinely follow norms in their practice communities without much
thought, some do so more consciously than others.  For example,
one lawyer said that he “hates formal discovery” and usually ex-
changes information informally if possible.  He often talks with his
counterpart about the timing of court appearances and if he thinks
that his client needs a cathartic event, he might say, “I think my
client needs to be heard on this issue” in court or mediation.145
This study demonstrates that lawyers use an OLN approach
with some regularity to resolve the ultimate issues in a case as well
as numerous other issues along the way.  Though one can identify
some cases that clearly fit the theoretical description of OLN, it is a
complex concept like PN and IBN and readers of early drafts have
struggled to determine whether processes in particular cases fit in
an OLN model or not.
V. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NEGOTIATION
A. General Characteristics of the Framework
Although some cases in this study fit neatly into the two major
models in current legal negotiation theory, Part IV demonstrates
that many do not fit very well because the various definitions of PN
and IBN models include numerous elements that are not present in
some real-life cases.146  Current theory involves only two basic
models147 consisting of correlated bundles of elements, so people
are confused when negotiations do not clearly fit into one of the
traditional models.  Theorists have dealt with this problem by say-
144 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
145 Interview, BC 02.
146 Professor Andrea Kupfer Schneider makes related critiques of the traditional system of
negotiation models, which she refers to as “labels.” See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a
New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 19–24 (2012).
147 Although OLN is a distinct model, it is new and not recognized in current theory. See
supra Part IV.C.
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ing that some cases involve a combination of the models.148  In my
view, it would be more helpful to provide a more flexible frame-
work that better reflects people’s experiences about how negotia-
tions actually vary.
The following is such a framework, which is inspired by Pro-
fessor Leonard Riskin’s revised grid system for analyzing media-
tion processes.149  An early formulation of this framework
consisted of a series of two-by-two tables like Riskin’s “new new”
grids illustrating the relationship between different pairs of vari-
ables.150  Using multiple grids is cumbersome and makes it hard to
relate numerous variables to each other.  So this framework com-
bines all variables into a single table, in Table 2.
Table 2.  Framework for Analyzing Negotiation
Continua of Negotiation Process Characteristics
No concern for other Great concern for
party’s interests other party’s interests
Exclusive use of includes everyday Exclusive use of
exchange of demands conversation interest-and-option
and offers process
Creation of no value Creation of
maximum possible
value
Hostile tone Friendly tone
Extreme use of No use of power
power
Exclusive focus on Exclusive focus on
extrinsic norms intrinsic norms
148 Several texts refer to a “soft positional” model (using various labels) which is a combina-
tion of the two traditional models. See supra note 52.  Some texts describe other combinations.
See FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 3, at 34 (“cooperative and competitive approaches may be
mixed or sequenced” and “adversarial” and “problem-solving” styles are “more intense” ver-
sions of these approaches); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 224–48 (recommendations for
negotiating at both a “net-expected-outcome table,” similar to PN and OLN, and an “interest-
based table”); NELKEN, supra note 3, at 159 (describing “tensions” between the two models and
negotiators may use both models at different times in a negotiation).
149 See Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New
New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 34–51 (2003).
150 Id. at 38–46.
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Table 2 displays the basic variables in the PN and IBN models.
The values in the left end of the continua reflect the traditional PN
theory and the values in the right end of the continua reflect the
traditional IBN theory.151  The framework can be used to analyze
cases fitting patterns other than the two traditional models such as
the various soft positional negotiation models,152 which would rely
primarily on an exchange of offers and the negotiators would dis-
play friendly tone.  In general, an OLN model would be in the
center of each row, though in a classic OLN process, negotiators
would be on the friendly end of the tone dimension and the extrin-
sic end of the source-of-norms dimension.153
The most significant aspect of this framework is that it disag-
gregates variables that theorists have aggregated into distinct mod-
els.  As the analysis in Part IV demonstrates, real-life negotiations
often do not fit into the traditional theoretical models very well.
As a result, people have been stuck trying to fit the “square pegs”
of their negotiation experiences into the “round holes” of the theo-
retical models.154  Separating the variables should help people fit
their experiences into meaningful theoretical categories.  Con-
versely, because of the confusion about what really are necessary
elements of the existing theoretical models, negotiators who want
to use these models may have a hard time doing so.
A related feature of this framework is that the variables gener-
ally are continuous, not dichotomous variables.155  For example,
current negotiation models often refer to whether the negotiators
seek to advance only their own interests or also to advance the
interests of the other party.  In real life, this is not an either-or
decision.  Rather, such motivations may vary widely and most ne-
gotiations probably are somewhere in the middle of the various
151 Several readers of an earlier draft of this Article thought that it suggested that all cases in
the two traditional models necessarily reflect extreme values for each of the variables in Table 2.
A major purpose of this Article is to highlight the fact that some PN and IBN cases do not
manifest all the extreme values from the traditional theory.
As noted above, some elements of the traditional theories are included in some but not all
of the law school texts surveyed. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
152 See supra note 52.
153 See supra Part IV.C.
154 See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text for an illustration of practitioners’ confu-
sion about the meaning of the negotiation models.
155 The row for communication process differs from the others as it is a categorical rather
than a continuous variable.  Although there is no strict order between the three values indicated
for this variable (i.e., use of offers, everyday conversation, and interest-and-option analysis),
everyday conversation seems somewhat intermediate between the other two.
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dimensions.  The middle column in Table 2 represents the range of
possible values for each variable.
Each of the variables may vary over time, so instead of provid-
ing a single static snapshot for the entire negotiation, the frame-
work enables people to analyze negotiation as a dynamic process
with different characteristics at different times in a case.  This is
helpful for the relatively short period of a final negotiation and it is
especially important considering the entire period of a
litigotiation.156
In addition, the variables may differ for various negotiators,
including differences between counterparts as well as between par-
ties and their lawyers.  Thus one could apply the framework differ-
ently for various negotiators in a case.  For example, in some cases,
the interactions between lawyers were friendly but the interactions
between the parties were hostile.157
The particular variables in Table 2 build on existing theory and
seem plausible but are not essential to this framework.  Unlike ap-
proaches that rely on combining many specific variables, this
framework is flexible and can easily accommodate different char-
acterizations of these variables as well as the addition of other
variables.158
B. Illustration of the Framework
This part illustrates how the framework can be used by apply-
ing it to the data in this study.  The first row of Table 2, regarding
the extent of concern for the other party’s interests, assumes that
each negotiator has a significant self-interest in virtually every case
but that negotiators differ in the extent to which they are con-
cerned about the other side’s interests.159  Negotiators whose be-
havior is completely selfish would be on the left end of the
continuum and those whose behavior reflects great concern for the
other party’s interests (as well as their own interests) would be on
156 For definition of litigotiation, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 79, 90–93, 98–100 (Cases 6, 9, and 11) and accompanying text.
158 For example, Professor Andrea Kupfer Schneider offers a framework for teaching negoti-
ation using variables of assertiveness, empathy, flexibility, social intuition, and ethicality. See
Schneider, supra note 145, at 27–36.  Some or all of these variables could be added to the
framework.
159 The degree of parties’ self-interest could vary in significant ways and could be added to
the framework if appropriate.  It seems likely that the degree of concern for the other party is
likely to vary much more and have a greater influence on negotiation dynamics.
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the right end of the continuum.160  Cases 1 and 2 illustrate a tradi-
tional PN approach, where the parties seemed to have little con-
cern for their counterparties’ interests and Cases 9 and 10 illustrate
a traditional IBN approach, where the parties generally had great
concern for each other.161  Cases 12 and 13 illustrate an OLN pro-
cess where the prosecutors and defense counsel were concerned
about seeming reasonable to each other, taking each others’ inter-
ests into account but not trying to promote their counterparts’ in-
terests, so these cases would be in the middle of this continuum.162
The framework may be especially helpful to analyze cases that
do not fit neatly into the traditional models.  For example, in Case
7, which was closest to the PN model, the husband in a divorce was
concerned about the welfare of his wife and children as well as his
own interests.163  So the husband would fit somewhere in the mid-
dle of the first variable.  On the other hand, in Case 9, which gener-
ally fits the IBN model, the wife, who had alcohol problems,
presumably was not very concerned about her husband or children
at the outset of the case, and would also fit in the middle of the
continuum at that stage of the process.164
The second row of Table 2 focuses on the communication pro-
cess to develop agreement.  In the traditional PN model, negotia-
tors develop agreements exclusively through the exchange of offers
and counter-offers and related communications.  Conversely, in the
traditional IBN model, negotiators explicitly identify the parties’
interests, discuss options for satisfying the parties’ respective inter-
ests, and then select an optimal option.  In an OLN model, negotia-
tors reach agreements primarily through discussion in an everyday
conversation.  As with the prior variable, the same cases fit the re-
spective models quite well.  Negotiators in Cases 1 and 2 reached
agreement almost exclusively through exchange of offers, negotia-
tors in Cases 9 and 10 carefully analyzed the parties’ interests and
considered options that best satisfied the parties’ interests, and in
160 This is essentially what Professor Robert Mnookin and his colleagues refer to as the ten-
sion between assertiveness and empathy. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 44–68.
161 See supra notes 66–72, 90–97 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.  Both Cases 13 and 14 are criminal cases
in which the defendants had somewhat different perspectives than their lawyers.  For example,
the lawyers had a strong interest in seeming reasonable to the prosecutors by accommodating
their interests, but the defendants may have had different views about this.
163 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.  As the case progressed, the wife’s concern
for her husband and children may have increased as she got treatment and her relationships
became more normal.
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Cases 13 and 14, the negotiators reached agreement through every-
day conversation.165  In Case 13, there was only one offer, which
was accepted and in Case 14, the agreement was based on a single
counter-offer, and the lawyers apparently engaged in no interest-
and-option analysis.166
Again, the framework can help analyze cases that do not fit
neatly into the models, such as Case 11, the property boundary
case in which the lawyers focused primarily on satisfying the par-
ties’ interests but finished the negotiation through an exchange of
offers.167  So this case would include at least two of the communica-
tions processes—and it probably included some everyday conver-
sation as well.
The third row reflects the degree to which the parties create
value in a negotiation.  This relates to the extent that the negotia-
tion is considered a zero-sum negotiation (on the left end of the
continuum) or a positive-sum negotiation on the right end of the
continuum).168  Traditional negotiation theory suggests that PN in-
volves negotiators who view the negotiation as a zero-sum exercise
and create no value.  Conversely, negotiation theory assumes that
negotiators using an IBN process seek to create value.  Although
some cases in this study fit these assumptions, some did not.  In
particular, negotiators in Cases 5 through 8 generally used a PN
process but seemed to create some value.169  In the property
boundary dispute in Case 11, the negotiators presumably created
significant value, but the grudging tone of parts of the negotiation
suggested that the negotiators may have “left some value on the
table.”170  Thus some of these cases would fit in the middle of this
continuum rather than at the ends.
Negotiators using an OLN process are likely to try to create
some value by satisfying each others’ interests.  In Cases 13 and 14,
the lawyers relied on norms of law and local practice and presuma-
bly created some value as compared with a possible PN negotia-
tion, though presumably not as much as if they used an IBN
165 See supra notes 66–72, 90–97, 127–34 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 127–34 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
168 Although this discussion refers to the outcome of the negotiation, it could be reframed to
focus on the negotiators’ efforts, if any, to try to create value.
169 See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
170 See Ernest M. Thiessen & Joseph P. McMahon, Jr., Beyond Win-Win in Cyberspace, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643, 645 (2000).
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process.  Thus, these cases would probably fit in the middle of this
continuum.171
The fourth row involves the level of friendliness or hostility in
the negotiation.  A traditional PN story portrays negotiators as bit-
ter enemies.172  Conversely, IBN often is portrayed as “amica-
ble.”173  These stories would place the two models in the familiar
left and right ends of the continuum in this row.  Although some of
the cases in this study fit the models, many cases did not.  Cases 1,
2 and 5 fit the traditional PN model of hostile negotiation,174 but
most of the other PN cases seemed to involve professional and
even cordial interactions between the lawyers and even some of
the parties, which would be located somewhere in the middle of
row four.  On the other hand, Case 11 was the IBN case involving
the property dispute in which there was some tension between the
lawyers, especially at the beginning of the case, so it would also be
in the middle of the continuum at that stage.175  Theoretically,
OLN cases should generally be on the friendly end of the contin-
uum, though there were moments of tension in OLN cases in this
study.176
There often were stark differences in the relationships be-
tween the lawyers and the parties and thus the framework could be
used to distinguish the level of friendliness or hostility between va-
rious negotiators.  In cases like the dispute between the brothers
over their father’s trust (Case 6), the lawyers cooperated quite well
even though their clients were bitterly opposed to each other.177
The fifth row deals with the degree to which the negotiators
tried to exercise power over each other.178  In the classic PN cases,
171 See supra notes 127–34 and accompanying text.
172 See FISHER & URY, supra note 15, at 9–14, 132–42.
173 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 66–72, 77–78 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 127–34 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
178 Power is a very complex subject considering that there are many sources of power and
ways of exercising it. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 8–29 (2000)
(describing nature and sources of power).  Litigation virtually always involves some degree of
pressure, at least through implicit threats to go to trial if the other side refuses to accept one’s
demand or offer.  Sometimes, parties make explicit threats to go to trial, which generally are
considered to be legitimate if there is a reasonable legal basis for the legal positions.  Parties can
exercise power by using a wide range of other negotiation tactics, which may be considered as
more or less legitimate. See CRAVER, supra note 3, at 170–203 (listing numerous negotiation
tactics that exercise power in varying degrees).  For the purpose of this Article, we need not
precisely analyze the magnitude and legitimacy of various uses of power.  The framework merely
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one or both sides tried to pressure the other to make concessions
through various tactics and thus would be located on the left end of
the continuum.  For example, in Case 1, the plaintiff’s lawyer alleg-
edly coached his client to change his testimony and intimidated a
witness to strengthen his legal position and exercise bargaining
power.179  In Case 2, in which the husband in a divorce frequently
used prostitutes, lawyers asked humiliating questions during depo-
sitions of both parties that were presumably intended to pressure
them into reducing their demands in negotiation.180  Case 10 illus-
trates a classic IBN negotiation in which the parties apparently re-
solved the issues about alimony purely through reason and not at
all through pressure, so it would fit on the right end of the contin-
uum.181  Case 13 illustrates an OLN case that might be placed in
the middle of the continuum.  In that case, the criminal defense
lawyer representing a youth charged with armed robbery worked
hard over an extended period to reason with the prosecutor.  This
strategy may have been based, in part, on the fact that the defense
counsel had little power to exercise, though he did engage in some
“brinksmanship” by letting the case proceed to the eve of trial, try-
ing to pressure the prosecutor to accept his offer for a shorter sen-
tence than she had been offering.182
This variable focuses on the use of power, recognizing that
some parties have power that they do not try to use.  For example,
in Case 9, involving the mother with alcohol problems, the father
presumably had the potential to exert great pressure on the mother
but decided not to do so.183  Although parties exercising power
often do so in an unfriendly way, this is not always the case.  In
Case 6, the lawyers had a very cooperative relationship, which did
not prevent the defense counsel from pressing advantages resulting
from a compelling witness and favorable legal rules.184
identifies a continuum of greater or lesser exercise of power and users of the framework can
provide their own such analyses.  Although the magnitude and legitimacy of use of power are
related, they are distinct and thus users of the framework may wish to treat them separately.
179 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  This case illustrates the fact that if one consid-
ers developing favorable evidence and making strong legal arguments as forms of power, the use
of power can be entirely legitimate.
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The sixth row focuses on the extent to which the negotiators
rely on extrinsic or intrinsic norms.185  In pretrial cases, the ex-
pected court result is the most prominent external norm, but other
norms include, for example, industry standards.  Intrinsic norms
are based on the negotiators’ own values rather than external
norms.  Presumably, PN negotiations would focus primarily on ex-
ternal norms as negotiators use the threat of litigation to gain bar-
gaining advantage.  Indeed, in virtually all the PN cases in this
study, the expected court outcome weighed heavily in the negotia-
tions.  In Case 2, where the divorcing couple settled on the morn-
ing of trial, the shadow of the law loomed large and undoubtedly
had a major effect on the negotiation.186  In some PN cases, intrin-
sic norms played a significant role.  For example, in Case 5, the
contentious labor grievance, the union’s and company’s norms
about negotiating grievances and collective bargaining agreements
seemed to predominate over the likely outcome of the arbitration
hearing as factors affecting the decision.187  Thus, this case would
be located in middle (or perhaps close to the “intrinsic” end) of
this continuum.
It is less clear that the traditional IBN model would be located
in the right end of the continuum in row six.  Although Getting to
Yes counsels reliance on anticipated court results (such as the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement) or objective standards,188
some proponents of IBN believe that this unduly shifts the focus
away from the parties’ interests.189  Case 10 illustrates a major reli-
ance on internal norms, as the divorcing spouses developed an
agreement for spousal support using a variable formula based on a
percentage of the husband’s income rather than a typical agree-
ment for a fixed amount.190  On the other hand, Case 11, the dis-
pute over property boundaries primarily involved an IBN process,
but the lawyers had a substantial discussion of the likely court out-
comes as well as the parties’ interests, so this case would fit in sev-
eral places on the continuum at different times in the case.191
185 This distinction is similar to Professor Ellen Waldman’s distinction between “norm-edu-
cating” and “norm-generating” mediation models. See supra note 116.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 68–72.  For discussion of the “shadow of the law,” see
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–72 (1979).
187 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
188 See FISHER & URY, supra note 15, at 81–94.
189 See Interview, SL 10.
190 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
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In theory, OLN cases should be in the left end of the contin-
uum as reliance on external norms is an essential characteristic of
this model.  Indeed, all the OLN cases in this study generally were
located on the left end of the continuum, though presumably nego-
tiators do consider some intrinsic norms at times.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for Negotiation Theory and Research
Accounts of cases in this Article demonstrate that, in the pre-
trial context, understanding negotiation requires scholars to focus
on litigotiation, “the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mo-
bilizing the court process.”192  In practice, lawyers know that most
cases will not be tried.  Although lawyers may prepare and posture
as if a case will be tried, most realize that pretrial maneuvering is
designed primarily for leverage to get the best possible settlement.
Good lawyers “prepare[ ] for settlement from day one of the law-
suit.”193  Thus negotiation theorists should not give short shrift to
the pretrial process by focusing only on the final stages as if law-
yers parachute into a negotiation just before the end of a case.  The
ultimate negotiation process unfolds out of the preceding events.
Moreover, scholars would provide a more realistic portrait of legal
negotiation if they contemplate all efforts to reach agreement, not
merely efforts to resolve disputes.
There is significant confusion in negotiation theory about the
traditional models of negotiation.  Although there is a general con-
sensus about the existence of two traditional models, there is no
consensus about the defining features of these models, which prob-
ably is why there is a profusion of different terms for them.194  It is
fairly easy to recognize extreme examples of the models, which dis-
play most or all of the characteristics attributed to them, but there
are significant deviations from these models in real life.195  This
study also documents the use of an ordinary legal negotiation ap-
proach, which does not exist in traditional negotiation theory,
192 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
194 See supra Part IV.
195 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\16-1\CAC111.txt unknown Seq: 56 22-OCT-14 14:04
56 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 16:1
though it presumably suffers from similar problems of conceptual
confusion.196
The traditional models have provided the foundation of legal
negotiation theory for several decades and it would be nice if they
could be rehabilitated.  They certainly reflect the reality of some
negotiation and they have captured the imaginations of many aca-
demics, students, and practitioners.  It is precisely because these
concepts have captured people’s thinking so much that it is hard to
change the concepts—and people’s minds.  Part of the problem is
the confused thinking about the models in which people often con-
sider PN as being tough and taking extreme positions and conceive
of IBN as being nice and taking reasonable positions.  The concep-
tual problems became particularly obvious to me through an expe-
rience with my negotiation class.  We discussed a draft of this
Article to analyze students’ experiences in a simulation.  All the
groups had a hard time categorizing the interactions in terms of the
models, saying that they used a mixture of them.  We talked about
how the framework would be more helpful.  Yet, when they wrote
papers about the simulation, most students used the theoretical
models and got tripped up by the same confusions I hear from col-
leagues and that are demonstrated in this Article.
When first writing this Article, I imagined that the framework
could be used to develop some consensus about the meaning of the
models and that the models would co-exist with the framework.  I
thought that the framework might help develop some consensus in
the field about which variables are and are not essential to the vari-
ous models.  But precisely because the conceptual models are so
deeply entrenched in people’s minds, it seems unlikely that this
could happen.  Although the fascination with the traditional mod-
els will make it hard for alternatives to gain general acceptance,
developing better alternatives seems more likely to be useful and
ultimately succeed than developing clear common understandings
of the traditional models.197  Indeed, reactions to earlier drafts of
this Article reflecting dissatisfaction with the traditional theory and
196 See supra Part IV.C.
197 The recommendation to replace the traditional models reflects a change in my thinking.
In a recent co-authored article, I wrote, “We believe that there is substantial value in maintain-
ing a general canon of negotiation while incorporating instruction of a wide range of additional
perspectives, topics, and teaching methods.” See John Lande et al., Principles for Designing
Negotiation Instruction, 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 299, 325 (2012).  I now believe that the
traditional models are so mesmerizing that it is hard to resist their spell.  So I think it would be
better to focus on other concepts and discuss the traditional models in footnotes.
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critiques like Professor Schneider’s198 suggest some readiness to let
go of the old theoretical approach and embrace a new one.
This Article demonstrates the value of a framework that un-
bundles variables in the traditional models (as well as the OLN
model), which can free scholars to consider how the variables re-
late to each other instead of simply assuming that all the variables
are highly correlated or that deviations from the models merely are
minor exceptions.199  This tool can enable scholars to consider a
much wider range of propositions by taking advantage of capabili-
ties to consider changes in the process over the course of a case,
and differences in perspectives of negotiators “behind” and
“across” the negotiating table.200  It can be readily improved by re-
fining the variables included in the framework.
This framework can be particularly helpful in providing a
structure for conducting empirical research.  Negotiation theory re-
lies largely on the analysis of hypothetical cases and it would be
valuable to describe legal negotiation patterns in real life.  Rather
than assuming that characteristics of negotiations are all grouped
together at the far ends of each continuum for each dimension in
Table 2, it seems likely that most legal negotiations actually congre-
gate in the middle of the dimensions.  It also seems likely that there
are different configurations based on the subject of the dispute.
For example, Professors Richard Miller and Austin Sarat found dif-
ferent patterns of disputing in tort, employment discrimination,
and divorce cases.201  This framework might enable researchers to
identify different patterns for different types of cases and explain
the underlying dynamics causing these patterns.
This framework also can be helpful in identifying changes over
time within a given case.  For example, Professor Dwight Golann
published a helpful study of simulated mediations that tracked pat-
terns of shifts on the Riskin grid during the course of a media-
tion.202  In the unmediated negotiation context, even the final
negotiations unfold over time and if one focuses on the full litigo-
tiation of a case, the process can last months or years.  Some IBN
theory describes how negotiators can shift from a PN to an IBN
198 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
199 See supra Part V.
200 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 178–223.
201 Richard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544 (1980–81).
202 See Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How–and Why–Legal Mediators Change
Styles in The Course of a Case, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 41.
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process.203  The framework in this Article can provide more preci-
sion in specifying desired shifts and developing hypotheses for em-
pirical testing about what prompts changes in the framework
variables.  Moreover, the factors in this framework are likely to be
used as causal factors affecting particular negotiation dynamics204
or goals.205  For example, many dispute resolution scholars want to
promote negotiations that increase efficiency and/or satisfy parties’
interests.  A framework of unbundled variables is likely to be more
helpful in this effort than relying on confusing models that require
many assumptions about negotiation behavior.
Although this study focuses on negotiation in pretrial litiga-
tion, there presumably are some analogs in lawyers’ negotiation of
transactions and appellate cases.  For example, it almost certainly
makes sense to analyze transactional negotiations from the earliest
interactions about the possible transaction rather than focus solely
on the final stages of the negotiation.  There also probably is an
analog of OLN where lawyers rely on industry standards and
norms rather than expected court outcomes as the central focus of
their negotiation.  In addition, it would probably be worthwhile to
analyze transactional and appellate and even non-legal negotia-
tions by disaggregating variables along the lines of the framework.
B. Implications for Negotiation Practice
Evidence in this study illustrating litigotiation phenomenon
can provide a reminder for lawyers that negotiation is not limited
only to resolution of substantive issues after they complete pretrial
activities.  Savvy lawyers know that litigation entails a continual
process of seeking agreements about a wide range of procedural
and substantive issues, often starting from the very beginning of a
case.  Moreover, lawyers seek agreements with many people in ad-
dition to their counterpart lawyers, including their clients.  Thus
203 See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 230–40.
204 For example, some variables in Table 2 might affect other variables in the table.  As an
illustration, researchers might hypothesize that demonstrating concern for a counterpart is likely
to increase the likelihood that the counterpart would use friendly negotiation tactics in response.
Although such a hypothesis may be difficult to test empirically because of uncertainties about
“causal order” in an extended interaction (e.g., whether the demonstration of concern caused
the counterpart to use friendly tactics or the use of friendly tactics caused a demonstration of
concern), this is a general problem of empirical research about such issues.
205 For a catalog of possible benefits of settlement, see Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settle-
ments, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 62–82 (1998).
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lawyers should focus consciously on opportunities to reach agree-
ments throughout a case and on a wide variety of matters that
would advance their clients’ interests.206
The framework in this Article can help practitioners better un-
derstand negotiation contexts and act effectively.  Although the
two traditional negotiation models can help negotiators plan moves
in cases that clearly fit these models, many cases—perhaps most—
do not fit neatly.  These two models are both too rigid and too
vague to help lawyers in many situations.  The models are too rigid
in implying that negotiation situations involve a set of highly inter-
correlated variables that all have values on the extreme end of pro-
cess continua.  But they are also too vague because there is confu-
sion about what characteristics are essential to the models.  In
practice, many lawyers probably find the models irrelevant to their
experience and unhelpful in managing their cases.  Although the
addition of a third model, “ordinary legal negotiation,” fills a major
void in the constellation of models, there probably are many situa-
tions that do not neatly fit any model.  By breaking the models into
variables that practitioners can readily recognize, they can better
manage their negotiation strategies and tactics.
C. Implications for Legal Education
The fact that negotiation is typically integrated in a litigotia-
tion process should help inform law school faculty about how to
train future lawyers.  It is relevant to courses involving pretrial liti-
gation, especially civil procedure, criminal procedure, pretrial prac-
tice, and interviewing and counseling.207  Since more cases are
resolved by negotiation than in trial, faculty in these courses should
teach that the focus of their pretrial strategy normally should be to
produce the most favorable possible settlement (however that is
defined).
206 Another article based on this study offers specific suggestions for lawyers.  It recommends
that lawyers to take charge of their cases from the outset, including getting a clear understanding
of clients and their interests, developing good relationships with counterpart lawyers, carefully
investigating the cases, making strategic decisions about timing, and enlisting mediators and
courts when needed. See John Lande, Good Pretrial Lawyering: Planning to Get to Yes Sooner,
Cheaper, and Better, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 63 (2014).
207 For an excellent article making this point at some length, see Jean R. Sternlight, Separate
and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 681, 690–712 (2005).
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Just as the “hidden curriculum” of most law school courses
teaches students that appellate litigation is “what really mat-
ters,”208 the hidden curriculum in most negotiation courses is that
the final negotiation is “where the action is,” with little attention to
the activities leading up to it.  Part of the problem with the hidden
curriculum is that the messages are repeated and implicit.209  The
hidden curriculum of negotiation courses is reflected in the struc-
ture of simulations, a central pedagogical feature of most negotia-
tion courses.  Most simulations are one-stage simulations focusing
solely on the final negotiation (or possibly including preparation
for this negotiation).210  Negotiation faculty can incorporate multi-
ple stages in negotiation simulations so that students can experi-
ence more of the reality of litigotiation.211
The framework described in Part V can be a useful pedagogi-
cal tool for negotiation faculty to help students understand key
variables in negotiation and avoid confusion when the traditional
models do not fit their simulation experiences.  This framework can
be adapted into a helpful teaching tool by adding a column for stu-
dents to assess the variables, as illustrated in Table 3.
208 David M. Moss, The Hidden Curriculum of Legal Education: Toward a Holistic Model for
Reform, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 20–21.
209 As Professor Jean Sternlight and I wrote:
These messages [of a hidden curriculum] are mostly implicit in the structure of law
school courses, erroneously suggesting that the bulk of what lawyers do is to analyze
and argue appellate law, and that other functions are less common or important.  The
implicit nature of these messages, which are repeatedly reinforced in multiple
courses, conveys a powerful subliminal lesson.  Because many law students are not
consciously aware of the message about lawyers’ roles, it is particularly hard to
correct.
John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curricu-
lum: Preparing Law Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247, 256
(2010).
210 Professor Marc Galanter noted the limitations of the one-stage simulations in his negotia-
tion courses:
These simulations—at least my primitive ones—have severe limits in preparing for
“real life” litigotiation games.  There are no ongoing relations between bargainers;
no reputations as bargainers to play on, to use for commitment, or to accumulate as
gains;  not enough time for things to develop; time is not available as sanction or
reward; there are no nonverbal moves (delay, filing, discovery, lining up experts, and
so forth).
Galanter, supra note 5, at 271.  Of course, there are severe limits in the capacity of any instructor
to cover all these things in a negotiation course as well as many other important topics. See
generally Lande et al., supra note 197 (describing overwhelming range of possible topics and
approaches in teaching negotiation).  Nonetheless, instructors can do more. See, e.g. Sternlight,
supra note 207.
211 See Lande, supra note 115, at 17–23; Ctr. for the Study of Disp. Resol., Univ. of Missouri,
Multi-Stage Simulations, available at http://law.missouri.edu/drle/teaching_materials.html#multi-
stage (collecting materials describing multi-stage simulations).
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Table 3.  Framework for Analyzing Negotiation for
Use in Teaching
Continua of Negotiation Process Characteristics Rating and/or
Comments
No concern for Great concern
other party’s for other party’s
interests interests
Exclusive use of includes Exclusive use of
exchange of everyday interest-and-
offers conversation option process
Creation of no Creation of
value maximum
possible value
Hostile tone Friendly tone
Extreme use of No use of
power power
Exclusive focus Exclusive focus
on extrinsic on intrinsic
norms norms
Students can be required to rate dimensions of a simulation
(such as with a scale from 0 to 10) and/or verbally describe the
relevant interactions.  This framework allows students to describe
their experiences more precisely, identify changes in the process
(such as a shift from using offers to ordinary conversation or from
hostile to friendly tone), and reflect on what caused the changes.
VII. CONCLUSION
Applying concepts from Thomas Kuhn’s theory of the devel-
opment of knowledge, the dispute resolution community is analo-
gous to a scientific community and has developed a dominant
paradigm of negotiation based on the positional and interest-based
models.212  This Article identifies some “anomalies” in this para-
212 Cf. KUHN, supra note 2, at 176 (“A scientific community consists . . . of the practitioners of
a scientific specialty.  To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, they have undergone similar
educations and professional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same technical
literature and drawn many of the same lessons from it.”).  For Kuhn’s definition of paradigms,
see supra note 1.
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digm, reflecting aspects of the paradigm that do not fit real-life ex-
perience very well.213  Conceivably, legal negotiation theorists
could try to use the proposed framework to fix these anomalies.
Considering the great conceptual confusion and the wide accept-
ance of the traditional theory, however, it probably is impossible to
fix the prevailing paradigm.  Although there is wide acceptance of
this paradigm, there is also dissatisfaction with it.  Hopefully, the
time is ripe for a revolutionary new paradigm.214  This Article pro-
poses a new framework that would be more useful to academics,
practitioners, and students.  If people find value in it (and, hope-
fully, feel inspired to critique and improve it), the framework will
lead to better understanding of the realities of legal negotiation.
213 Id. at 5–6 (anomalies are problems in normal science that resist solution by “known rules
and procedures”).
214 Id. at 92 (defining a scientific revolution as the replacement of one paradigm by an “in-
compatible new one”).  Although the framework proposed in this Article is not inherently in-
compatible with the traditional theoretical models, it may be incompatible as a practical social
matter since academics, practitioners, and students are unlikely to use both theoretical systems.
